The Derivative and Discretionary-Function Immunities of Presidential and Congressional Aides in Constitutional Tort Actions by Sowle, Kathryn D.
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles Faculty and Deans
1983
The Derivative and Discretionary-Function
Immunities of Presidential and Congressional
Aides in Constitutional Tort Actions
Kathryn D. Sowle
University of Miami School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathryn D. Sowle, The Derivative and Discretionary-Function Immunities of Presidential and Congressional Aides in Constitutional Tort
Actions, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 943 (1983).
The Derivative and Discretionary-Function Immunities
of Presidential and Congressional Aides
in Constitutional Tort Actions
KATHRYN Dix SOWLE*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 944
II. HARLOW V. FnzGERALD .......................................... 945
III. THE COURT'S RECONCILIATION OF HARLOW and Burz v. EcoNoMou on the
Issue of Discretionary-Function Immunity .......................... 950
IV. THE COURT'S RECONCILIATION OF HARLOW and GRAVEL V. UNIrED STATES
on the Issue of Derivative Immunity .............................. 955
A. Gravel v. United States ...................................... 955
B. The Inadequacy of Harlow's Basis for Distinguishing Gravel ....... 958
V. DERIVATIVE IMMUNITY IN HARLOw and GRAVEL ...................... 959
A. Derivative Immunity Defined .................................. 959
B. The Applicability of Derivative Immunity in Gravel ............... 965
C. Tile Inapplicability of Derivative Immunity in Harlow ............. 966
VI. QUESTIONS GENERATED BY HARLOW Concerning the Immunity of
Presidential and Congressional Aides .............................. 976
A. The Problems Created by Harlow Concerning the Derivative
Immunity of Presidential Aides ................................ 976
B. The Problems Created by Harlow Concerning the Discretionary-
Function Immunity of Congressional Aides ...................... 978
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................... 984
* B.A., Wellesley College 1953; J.D., Northwestern University 1956. Professor of Law, University of Miami
School of Law.
The Derivative and Discretionary-Function Immunities
of Presidential and Congressional Aides
in Constitutional Tort Actions
KATHRYN Dix SOWLE
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the United States Supreme Court has considered many complex
questions concerning official immunity defenses in so-called "constitutional tort"
actions-the actions extended by 42 U.S.C. § 19831 for violations of constitutional
rights2 by persons acting under color of state law and by Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics3 for such violations by persons
acting under color of federal law. Of the numerous questions these actions have
generated, 4 those raised by official immunity defenses5 are among the most prob-
The author gratefully acknowledges indebtedness to her colleagues Dean Claude R. Sowle and Professors Kenneth
Casebeer, Bernard H. Oxman, and Thomas A. Robinson for their critical evaluations of the original manuscript and to Mr.
Steven E. Eisenberg, a student in the University of Miami School of Law, for his valuable research assistance.
1. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (as amended by Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284, 1284).
Although this provision was enacted as Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1878). it
was in virtual disuse until "resurrected" in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See Developments in the Lai-Section
1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
2. For a discussion of the limited availability of the § 1983 remedy for violations of purely statutory federal rights,
see Note, The Section 1983 Remedy and Purely Statutory Federal Rights: Ryans v. New Jersey Commission for the Blind
and Visually Impaired, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 465.
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). It should be noted that Bivens actions could be eliminated in 1984. See Nat'l L.J., Dec.
12, 1983, at 15. Bills pending in both houses of Congress would substitute actions against the federal government under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) for
actions against governmental employees under Bivens. See Nat'l L.J., Dec. 12, 1983, at 15. The current stumbling block
to passage of these bills is a debate over whether official immunity defenses should be available in the substituted action.
The administration favors preserving these defenses, while several groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union,
oppose use of these defenses in actions against the government. Id.
4. For comprehensive reviews of § 1983 and Bivens issues, see S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION (1979); Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CoRNEt.L L. REV. 482
(1982).
Constitutional tort actions have also generated important aspects of the controversy over the proper role of the
judiciary in "public law" litigation. For discussions ofa cluster of problems being debated as "public versus private law"
issues, see Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step by Way of the Public-Private Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law (to be published in 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. - (1983)); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. Rev. 1281 (1976); The PubliclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982).
5. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional
Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 526 (1977); Shuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress,
and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 281; Sowle, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983
Cases: The Unresolved Issues of the Conditions for Its Use and the Burden of Persuasion, 55 TUL. L. REv. 326 (1981);
Comment, Allocating Liability for Constitutional Torts: Reconciling the Official's Liability for Unconstitutional Conduct.
the Entity's Liability for Unconstitutional Official Policy, and the Immunity Doctrines, 46 ALB. L. REv. 475 (1982);
Comment, Immunity of Federal Executive Officials to Damage Suits for Constitutional Violations,
19 Hous. L. REv. 299 (1982).
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
lematic because they require the Court to strike a difficult balance between the public
interest in effective performance of official duties and the opposing interest in civil
redress and deterrence of constitutional wrongs.
6
The type of official immunity the Court has considered most often is
discretionary-function immunity. This immunity may be absolute or qualified, but in
either form it protects the defendant official from liability for the consequences of his
decisions when the court determines that the need for protecting the official's de-
cisionmaking functions outweighs the competing interests. 7 A second type of immu-
nity the Court has considered is derivative immunity. Although this immunity pro-
tects the defendant official from liability for the consequences of his actions, its
purpose is to protect, not the discretionary functions of the defendant official, but
those of the defendant's superior officer. 8 For the most part, the Court has developed
the rules governing discretionary-function immunity with reasonable clarity and
proper attention to the various interests at stake.9 In contrast, however, the Court has
failed to delineate the rules governing derivative immunity with adequate clarity or
proper identification of the specific interests involved. 10 The Court has used an overly
broad "functional" approach l l that is too blunt a tool for a clear demarcation of all
the relevant concerns.
A complicated series of events that began in 1968 with whistle-blowing on Air
Force cost overruns and later involved developments in the Watergate hearings' 2
ultimately produced constitutional tort actions presenting the Court with difficult
issues concerning both discretionary-function and derivative immunity. The Court
resolved those issues in two controversial, interrelated decisions, Nixon v.
Fitzgerald13 and Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 14 This Article concerns the poorly rational-
ized derivative-immunity holding in Harlow, which has produced problems of pre-
dictability concerning the immunity defenses of both presidential and congressional
aides and could lead to decisions on these defenses that would strike an improper
balance between the significant interests at stake.
II. HARLOW V. FITZGERALD
On November 13, 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst in the
Department of the Air Force, appeared before a congressional subcommittee and
6. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503 (1978); Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318-22 (1975). Bivens actions against
federal officials also may present constitutional issues concerning the separation-of-powers doctrine. See, e.g., Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2701-04 (1982); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2735 n.17 (1982).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 50-79 and 116-18.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 114-27.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 50-79. But see Sowle, supra note 5, at 349-54 (criticizing Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), for its failure to distinguish between issues of discretionary-function and ministerial
immunities).
10. See infra text parts IV-Vl.
11. Id.
12. See infra note 24.
13. 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
14. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
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testified to massive cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane. 15 In January 1970 the
Air Force eliminated Fitzgerald's position in a "departmental reorganization and
reduction in force" taken "to promote economy and efficiency in the armed
forces." 16 Fitzgerald was dismissed from his job and received no offer of alternative
federal employment.17
Fitzgerald instituted proceedings before the Civil Service Commission, which
found that the elimination of his job had been motivated by "reasons purely personal
to" Fitzgerald. 18 He won a back pay order and, after further protracted proceedings,
reached a settlement agreement with the Air Force under which he was to resume his
former position on June 21, 1982.19
In addition to the Commission proceedings, Fitzgerald brought an action for
civil damages in the United States District Court against former President Richard M.
Nixon and two of Nixon's senior White House aides, Bryce Harlow20 and Alexander
Butterfield.2 1 Fitzgerald alleged that, in violation of his rights under two federal
statutes22 and the first amendment to the Constitution, 23 the defendants had conspired
to retaliate for his congressional testimony by depriving him of his Air Force job,
denying him reemployment, and besmirching his reputation. 24 He averred that the
defendants' actions were taken in their official capacities.
25
15. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2693-94 (1982). Fitzgerald also testified that unforeseen technical
difficulties had been encountered in the development of the plane. Id.
16. Id. at 2693.
17. Id. at 2695.
18. Id. at 2696. The Commission ruled that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation that his dismissal
was in retaliation for his congressional testimony. Id. Instead, it ruled that the dismissal resulted from his superiors'
dissatisfaction with his job performance, as evidenced by "statements that he was not a 'team player' and 'not on the Air
Force team.' " Id. at 2696 n.16. It further held that a "reduction in force" could not be used to dismiss Fitzgerald for
reasons "personal" to him. Id.
For a recent review and evaluation of remedies available to "whistleblowers," see Vaughn, Statutory Protection of
Whistleblowers in the Federal Executive Branch, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 615.
19. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2696 n.17 (1982).
20. Bryce Harlow served as a presidential aide to President Richard Nixon from January 1969 through November
1969. On November 4, 1969, Harlow assumed the cabinet-level position of Counsellor to the President. Harlow left this
position in December 1970 to return to private life. He resumed the position of Counsellor on July 1, 1973, and served
through April 14, 1974. Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2730, n.1 (1982).
21. Alexander Butterfield served the White House as Deputy Assistant to the President and as Deputy Chief of Staff
to H. R. Haldeman until March 1973. Id. at 2731 & n.6.
22. The statutes relied on by Fitzgerald are 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. III 1979) ("The right of employees ... to
.. furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or a Member thereof, may not be interfered with
or denied.") and 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1976) (a criminal statute prohibiting obstruction of congressional testimony). Neither
statute expressly grants a right to civil damages for its violation. Fitzgerald's theory was that a private cause of action for
damages could be inferred under each statute. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2697 n.20 (1982); Harlow, 102
S. Ct. 2727, 2732 & n.10 (1982).
Regarding the statutory actions, an ironic historical footnote in Fitzgerald's Supreme Court brief states as follows:
As a Senator, Mr. Nixon sponsored a proposed amendment to [18 U.S.C. § 1505] that would have created
a presumption that adverse personnel actions against a congressional witness within one year of his testimony
were retaliatory. See S. Rep. No. 414, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1951). Senator Nixon said in support of his
amendment, "Unless protection is given to witnesses who are members of the armed services or employees of
the Government, the scheduled hearings will amount to no more than a parade of yes men for administration
policies as they exist." 97 CONo. REC. 439394 (1951).
Brief for Respondent at 33 n.40, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
23. The pertinent first amendment language provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech .... ." U.S. Corsr. amend. I.
24. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2697 n.19, 2705 (1982).
Fitzgerald initially brought suit against Butterfield, several Department of Defense and Air Force officials, and
"Other Persons Including but Not Limited to One or More White House Aides, Whose Identities Are at This Time
Unknown to the Plaintiff, but Who Are Designated Herein as John Does." Fitzgerald v. Seamans. 553 F.2d 220, 229 n. 16
1983] CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 947
The district court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, hold-
ing that Fitzgerald had stated triable causes of action for violation of his statutory and
constitutional rights and that none of the defendants was entitled to absolute immu-
nity by reason of his official position.26 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit dismissed without opinion the defendants' collateral appeals from
the district court's denials of immunity.2 7 The Supreme Court granted a petition for
certiorari in Nixon v. Fitzgerald to consider the scope of immunity available to the
President of the United States. 28 It also granted a petition for certiorari in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald to determine the scope of immunity available to the President's senior
aides and advisers.29
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald30 the Supreme Court held, in a five to four decision, that
Nixon, "as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity
from damages liability predicated on his official acts."'" The Court considered
(D.C. Cir. 1977). More than three years had elapsed between Fitzgerald's discharge and the filing of his action. The
district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the ground that D.C. CODE § 12-301(8) (1973),
which provided a three year statute of limitations for actions not otherwise enumerated, barred Fitzgerald's complaint.
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688,690 (D.D.C. 1974), affd inpart, rev'd in part, 553 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed with respect to the Air Force and
Defense Department officials, but reversed with respect to Butterfield. 553 F.2d 220, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Because
Fitzgerald did not discover the White House involvement in the alleged conspiracy to terminate his job until the Watergate
hearings on August 31, 1973, the court held that the statute of limitations had tolled. Under the equitable doctrine of
"'discovery-diligence," the court found that a "defendant's fraud or deliberate concealment of material facts" tolled the
statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovered, or could have discovered with reasonable diligence, the basis of the
lawsuit. Id. at 228. Since it was only by chance that a memorandum implicating Butterfield appeared during the hearings,
the statute did not run until that time. The memorandum, written by Butterfield to H. R. Haldeman, White House Chief of
Staff, described Fitzgerald as a" 'basic nogoodnik' who 'must be given very low marks in loyalty.' " Id. at 225. The
memorandum went on to state: "We should let him bleed, for a while at least. Any rush to pick him up and put him back
on the Federal payroll would be tantamount to an admission of earlier wrong-doing on our part." Id. Following extensive
discovery after remand, Fitzgerald was permitted to amend his complaint to include Nixon and Harlow as defendants.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2697 (1982).
25. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2693 (1982); Harlow. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2730 (1982).
26. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2697 (1982); Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2732 (1982).
27. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2697 (1982); Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2732 (1982).
28. 452 U.S. 959 (1981).
29. Id. The Court had an earlier opportunity to reach these issues when it granted certiorari in Kissinger v. Halperin,
446 U.S. 951 (1980), to review a court of appeals decision granting only qualified immunity in a Bivens action to former
President Richard M. Nixon, former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, and former Presidential Aide H. R. Haldeman.
Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), affd in part, cert. dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). In a
brief per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the court of appeals decision by an equally divided vote. Kissinger v.
Halperin, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., taking no part in the consideration or decision of the case).
The action was brought by a former member of the National Security Council staff, his wife, and his children for
money damages for alleged violation of their fourth amendment rights from a wiretap of their home telephone. They also
alleged violation of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1976).
606 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court of appeals held that Mitchell and Haldeman could claim only a qualified
immunity under Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), and would be entitled to such immunity if they could "show
that they had reasonable grounds for believing their actions were legal . . . and that there was no malice or bad faith in
either the initiation or the conduct of the wiretapping." 606 F.2d 1192, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Unwilling to hold that
Nixon's "status as President sets him apart from the other high Executive officials named as defendants to this action,"
id. at 1210, the court held that Nixon was not entitled to absolute immunity. The court considered that qualified immunity
gave sufficient protection to "satisfy our concern that suits like this one would place major unwarranted demands on a
President's time." Id. at 1213. The court also considered that "the application of qualified immunity to defendant Nixon
is mandated by our tradition of equal justice under law." Id.
30. 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
31. Id. at 2701. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court: Chief Justice Burgerjoined this opinion and wrote
a separate concurring opinion. Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined. Justice Blackmun also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
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absolute immunity "a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique
office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported
by our history."-
32
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,33 however, the Court held, in an eight to one decision,
that presidential aides "generally are entitled only to a qualified immunity."
34
Although the Court significantly broadened the scope of the qualified immunity
defense,35 it rejected the defendants' claim that derivative absolute immunity was
32. Id.
33. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
34. Id. at 2734. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion, in
which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun filed a separate
concurring statement. Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion.
Harlow did not consider an issue relevant to Fitzgerald's action that later was resolved in Bush v. Lucas, 51
U.S.L.W. 4752 (U.S. 1983). See Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2740 n.36 (1982). Bush held that a Bivens action is
unavailable as a damages remedy "for federal employees whose First Amendment rights are violated by their superiors."
51 U.S.L.W. 4752, 4753 (U.S. 1982). In Bivens the Court extended a damages remedy directly underthe Constitution for
violation of the plaintiff's fourth amendment rights by federal law enforcement officers. 403 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1971).
The Court in Bivens observed, "The present case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress." Id. at 396. In Bush, however, the Court found "special factors counselling hesitation"
in the " 'federal personnel policy' " reflected in the civil service remedial scheme for handling employee grievances. 51
U.S.L.W. 4752, 4756-59 (U.S. 1983). The Court declined to recognize a damages remedy, stating:
Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between
federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service. Not only has Congress developed considerable familiar-
ity with balancing government efficiency and the rights of employees, but it also may inform itself through
factfinding procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts.
Id. at 4758.
Had the holding in Bush come sooner, Fitzgerald's Bivens action clearly would have failed. After remand by the
Supreme Court, however, his action was settled before the Court rendered its decision in Bush. Telephone interview with
John E. Nolan, Jr., Esq., who represented Fitzgerald before the Supreme Court (July 27, 1983).
Fitzgerald's statutory actions, however, would have been unaffected by Bush, which concerned only an action for
violation of first amendment rights. The Court in Harlow did not consider the legal sufficiency of the statutory actions,
stating only that
[w]e do not view petitioners' argument on the statutory question as insubstantial. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 72 L. Ed. 2d 182, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982) (controlling question
in implication of statutory causes of action is whether Congress affirmatively intended to create a damages
remedy) ....
102 S. Ct. 2727, 2740 n.36 (1982).
35. In Harlow the Court observed that its previous decisions had defined qualified or "good faith" immunity as
having both an "objective" and a "subjective" element. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737 (1982). The Court stated:
Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity would be defeated
if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury ....-
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975)).
In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Court had considered that this definition of qualified immunity was
an appropriate accommodation of competing values, in part because it would permit "[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be
quickly terminated" on summary judgment. 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978). In Harlow, however, the Court decided that
"[tihe subjective element of the good faith defense frequently has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that
insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial." 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737 (1982). Concerned that "substantial costs attend
the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials," id. at 2738, and that "[inquiries of this kind can be
peculiarly disruptive of effective government," id., the Court redefined qualified immunity to omit the malice limitation
on the privilege. Id.
It should be noted that, although the Court generally has referred to the malice component as the subjective element,
see Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737 (1982), there actually have been two subjective components: (I) the malice element,
and (2) the knowledge element. The official was not entitled to qualified immunity (1) if he acted "with the malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury," Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975),
or (2) if he "knew ... that the action he took ... would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff]," id. In
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Harlow the Court said it was "defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms." 102 S. Ct. 2727,
2739 (1982). The Court also stated: "We . . . hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). The Court,
however, preserved a role for the subjective knowledge element as a component limiting the immunity. In describing the
operation of qualified immunity, as redefined, the Court stated:
On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but
whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly
established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could
he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, the
immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law
governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and
can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be
sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on objective factors.
Id. at 2739 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). This statement appears to mean that if the law was not clearly
established, liability is totally precluded. If, however, the law was clearly established, then the defendant is subject to
liability if he knew of the relevant legal standard, even though a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances
would not have known of it.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Harlow, in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined, confirms this
continued role of the knowledge element of the redefined immunity. The opinion states as follows:
I agree with the substantive standard announced by the Court today, imposing liability when a public-
official defendant "knew or should have known" of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions. This
standard would not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating the law to escape liability for his
actions, even if he could not "reasonably have been expected" to know what he actually did know. Thus the
clever and unusually well-informed violator of constitutional rights will not evade just punishment for his crime.
Id. at 2740 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). For a critical view of Harlow's redefinition of qualified
immunity, see The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1, 233-36 (1982). See also Freed, supra note 5, at
551-62. This pre-Harlow article argues that an official who has violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff should not
be protected by qualified immunity, even if those rights were not clearly established at the time of the violation, if the
official acted "out of a desire to injure the plaintiff," id. at 556, or if he acted unreasonably-the question of the unsettled
state of law being only one factor to be considered on the issue of reasonableness, id. at 557.
The Court's redefinition of qualified immunity in Harlow has been held to apply not only to Bivens actions, but also
to § 1983 actions. See Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983). This view no doubt is correct. In Harlow the
Court observed:
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity available to state officials sued for
constitutional violations under § 1983. We have found previously, however, that "it would be untenable to draw
a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits
brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials."
102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 n.30 (1982) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
It also is worth noting that, in redefining qualified immunity, the Harlow Court may have resolved most of the burden
of persuasion issues concerning qualified immunity. In Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980), the Court held that the
defendant has the burden of pleading qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. Id. at 640. Gomez, however, did not
resolve the burden of persuasion question. Id. at 642 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2737 n.24
(1982). Lower courts have differed on this issue. Sowle, supra note 5, at 393-94. For contrary views as to where this
burden should be placed, compare id. at 393-402 (arguing that the defendant should bear this burden), with Freed, supra
note 5, at 562-63 (arguing that the plaintiff should bear the burden to show subjective bad faith, while the defendant
should bear the burden to show the reasonableness of his conduct).
In Harlow the Court gave no indication concerning the burden of persuasion on the issue whether the law was
"clearly established" at the time of the conduct in question. This issue, however, appears to be a question of law, not one
of fact. See 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2739 (1982) ("On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the
currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred."). Consequently, the
question who has the burden of persuasion may not be a significant issue.
Under Harlow, if the law was not clearly established, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, assuming, of
course, that he was acting within the scope of his authority. Id. It appears from Harlow that the defendant has the burden
to show he was so acting, because the Court specifically placed the burden on the defendant to make such a showing in the
analogous context of absolute immunity. See id. at 2735-36. If the law was clearly established, the defendant appears to
bear the burden of persuasion on the remaining qualified immunity issues. The Court stated:
If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent
public official should know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense
claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant
legal standard, the defense should be sustained.
Id. at 2739 (emphasis added).
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"made essential by all the considerations that support absolute immunity for the
President himself." 3 6 The Court distinguished its 1972 decision in Gravel v. United
States,3 7 which granted derivative absolute immunity to the "legislative acts" of a
Senator's aide under the speech or debate clause of the Constitution.
3 8 The Court also
rejected the defendants' argument that their "special functions" warrant absolute
immunity for White House aides in the performance of all their duties.
39 The Court
held that its 1978 decision in Butz v. Economou 4° controlled the scope of immunity of
presidential aides. Butz held that, in an action for damages for the violation of the
plaintiff's constitutional rights, a cabinet officer was entitled to only a qualified
41immunity.
Chief Justice Burger dissented, stating, "I am at a loss . . . to reconcile this
conclusion with our holding in Gravel v. United States."-42 He regarded Butz as
"clearly distinguishable" 43 and stated: "If indeed there is an irreconcilable conflict
between Gravel . . . and Butz . . . the Court has an obligation to try to harmonize its
holdings--or at least tender a reasonable explanation. The Court has done neither. 
,
44
This Article examines the question whether Harlow's denial of derivative abso-
lute immunity legitimately can be reconciled with both Butz and Gravel. It takes the
position that Harlow and Butz easily can be reconciled,45 and that Harlow and Gravel
legitimately can be reconciled, but not on the grounds employed by the Court.
4 6 In
the process of comparing Harlow and Gravel, the Article attempts to clarify the
fundamental differences between discretionary-function and derivative immunity
4 7
-
differences that the Court in Harlow failed to delineate. This Article concludes with
the identification of several important questions regarding the immunity of presi-
dential and congressional aides as yet unresolved by the Court. 48 It proposes answers
to some, if not all, of these questions and sets forth the questions that should be
addressed if these issues are to be resolved in a defensible manner giving adequate
protection to the competing constitutional values.
III. THE COURT'S RECONCILIATION OF HARLOW AND BUTZ v. ECONOMOU ON
THE ISSUE OF DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION IMMUNITY
The Court's decision in Harlow that no blanket absolute immunity attaches to
the "special functions" of senior presidential aides appears entirely consistent with
36. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2734 (1982).
37. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
38. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2734 (1982). The speech or debate clause is contained in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, ci. 1, which
reads as follows:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by
Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses,
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place.
39. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2735-36 (1982).
40. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
41. Id.
42. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2741 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2741 n.2.
45. See infra part I1.
46. See infra parts IV-V.
47. See infra notes 116-35 and accompanying text.
48. See infra part VI.
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Butz v. Economou and other Supreme Court decisions in constitutional tort cases
concerning the immunity of executive officers exercising discretionary functions.49
Traditionally, the common law has extended some form of immunity to govern-
ment officers from civil damage liability for the exercise of discretionary functions.
50
Governmental decisionmaking has been protected for two fundamental reasons: (1)
the unfairness of asking officials to exercise discretion, only to require that they later
be judged on the validity of their decisions, and (2) the danger that subjecting
officials to civil litigation will impede the effective operation of government by
distracting them from their duties, discouraging "fearless decisionmaking," and
deterring responsible persons from seeking office.
51
In both common-law and constitutional tort actions, the Supreme Court has
granted absolute immunity to government officers exercising adjudicative, pro-
secutorial, and legislative functions. 52 In common-law tort actions, the Court has
granted absolute immunity to federal officers in the exercise of discretionary execu-
tive functions.53 In constitutional tort actions, however, the Court has been less
generous; except for its grant of absolute immunity to the President in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,s4 the Court has granted only a qualified immunity to executive officers in
section 1983 and Bivens actions.
55
Section 1983 makes no reference to immunity defenses. 56 The Court, however,
has held that "immunities 'well grounded in history and reason' [have] not been
abrogated 'by covert inclusion in the general language' of § 1983.' 7 The provision
"is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses
rather than in derogation of them."-5 8 The Court's section 1983 immunity decisions,
49. As noted supra note 35, the Harlow opinion appears to clarify some previously unresolved questions concerning
the burden of persuasion on qualified immunity issues. The opinion also contains an interesting dictum relevant to a
question raised by Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), concerning whether in constitutional tort actions
qualified immunity is available to all government employees or only to those exercising discretionary functions. See
Sowle, supra note 5, at 354-93 (arguing that Navarette should not be interpreted as extending qualified immunity to
officers exercising purely ministerial functions and discussing what defenses should be available to these officers); see
also Freed, supra note 5, at 551 (interpreting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), as extending qualified immunity
to all executive officers in constitutional tort actions, not only to those exercising discretionary functions). In Harlow the
Court stated, "Immunity generally is available only to officers performing discretionary functions." 102 S. Ct. 2727,
2738 (1982). In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan observed, "I .. . agree that [the qualified immunity test adopted
by the Court in Harlowl applies 'across the board,' to all 'government officials performing discretionary functions.' "Id.
at 2740 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2738).
50. Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2732 (1-982); Sowle, supra note 5, at 353.
51. Freed, supra note 5, at 529-30; Sowle, supra note 5, at 386-87. In Harlow the Court stated, "As recognized at
common law, public officers require [some form of immunity from suits for damages] to shield them from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2732 (1982). The Court
also acknowledged "' ' the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public
interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.' " Id. at 2733 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 506 (1978)).
52. Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2732-33 (1982) (citing Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491
(1975) (legislative functions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judicial functions); Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478 (1978) (prosecutorial functions)).
53. Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2732 (1982) (citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.
483 (1896)).
54. 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
55. Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2732 (1982) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
56. For language of § 1983, see supra note 1.
57. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)).
58. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).
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therefore, have been "predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity histor-
ically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it." 5 9
The Court has considered not only the common-law immunities and the interests
they protect, but also the purposes underlying section 1983. Thus, only if the Court
has found that recognition of an immunity is consistent with the purposes of section
1983 has it granted the claimed immunity. In Scheuer v. Rhodes60 the Court refused
to grant absolute immunity to a state governor and other high state officials, despite
common-law precedent for the recognition of their absolute immunity. 6' The Court
acknowledged its prior section 1983 decisions recognizing the absolute immunity of
legislators for their legislative acts and of judges acting within their judicial role. The
legislative immunity was justified because "it was highly improbable that
'Congress-itself a staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a
tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general
language . . . ' of this statute."-62 Judicial absolute immunity was justified because
"had the Congress intended to abolish the common-law 'immunity of judges for acts
within the judicial role,' it would have done so specifically." 6 3 Concerning the
importance of judicial absolute immunity, the Court observed that a judge's errors
may be corrected on appeal and that the burden of the fear of lawsuits from dis-
satisfied litigants charging malice or corruption "would contribute not to principled
and fearless decision-making but to intimidation. "64 In contrast, however, the Court
concluded that absolute immunity of executive officials in the exercise of discretion-
ary functions would be inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983. The Court
stated:
It can hardly be argued, at this late date, that under no circumstances can the officers of
state government be subject to liability under this statute. In Monroe v. Pape, Mr. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, held that the section in question was meant "to give a
remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an
official's abuse of his position." 365 U.S. at 172. Through the Civil Rights statutes,
Congress intended "to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those
who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they
act in accordance with their authority or misuse it." Id. at 171-172.
Since the statute relied on thus included within its scope the "' [m]isuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law,'" id., at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 326 (1941)), government officials, as a class, could not be totally exempt, by virtue
of some absolute immunity, from liability under its terms. Indeed, as the Court also
indicated in Monroe v. Pape, the legislative history indicates that there is no absolute
immunity. 6
5
59. Id. at 421.
60. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
61. See 2 F. HAR'ER & F. JA.iEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.10 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES];
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 988 (4th ed. 1971).
62. 416 U.S. 232, 244 (1974) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)).
63. Id. (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)) (citations omitted).
64. Id. (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
65. Id. at 243 (some citations omitted).
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The Court considered that
[u]nder the criteria developed by precedents of this Court, § 1983 would be drained of
meaning were we to hold that the acts of a governor or other high executive officer have
"the quality of a supreme and unchangeable edict, overriding all conflicting rights of
property and unreviewable through the judicial power of the Federal Govemment." 66
In Butz v. Econonou67 the Court applied this same reasoning in a Bivens
action, 68 denying absolute immunity to the Secretary of Agriculture and other federal
executive officers exercising discretionary functions. Although actions alleging con-
stitutional violations against federal officers are not governed by section 1983, the
Court stated, "[I]n the absence of congressional direction to the contrary, there is no
basis for according to federal officials a higher degree of immunity from liability
when sued for a constitutional infringement as authorized by Bivens than is accorded
state officials when sued for the identical violation under § 1983. ' ' 69 The Court
observed that "the cause of action recognized in Bivens would similarly be 'drained
of meaning' if federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity for their con-
stitutional transgressions."-
70
The Court said the issue before it was "how best to reconcile the plaintiffs right
to compensation with the need to protect the decisionmaking processes of an execu-
tive department.", 7 1 In resolving that issue, the Court stated:
Our opinion in Bivens put aside the immunity question; but we could not have
contemplated that immunity would be absolute. If, as the Government argues, all officials
exercising discretion were exempt from personal liability, a suit under the Constitution
could provide no redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any degree deter federal
officials from committing constitutional wrongs. Moreover, no compensation would be
available from the Government, for the Tort Claims Act prohibits recovery for injuries
stemming from discretionary acts, even when that discretion has been abused.72
The Court did not regard as controlling the decision in Barr v. Matteo,73 in
which a plurality of the Court extended absolute immunity to a federal executive
officer in a common-law tort action because the officer was acting in the exercise of a
discretionary function within the outer perimeter of his authority. The Court in Butz
stated, "[W]e are confident that Barr did not purport to protect an official who has
not only committed a wrong under local law, but also violated those fundamental
principles of fairness embodied in the Constitution." 74 This lower level of immunity
in constitutional tort actions against federal executive officials is defensible because
"plaintiffs suing to challenge constitutional deprivations are vindicating not only
66, Id. at 248 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932)).
67. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
68. See supra text accompanying note 3.
69. 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978).
70. Id. at 501 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 503.
72. Id. at 505 (footnote omitted).
73. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
74. 438 U.S. 478, 495 (1978) (footnote omitted).
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private, but also public interests." 7 5 The availability of a damage award provides "a
powerful incentive to the vindication of these public interests."76
The Court in Butz did not rule out the possibility that federal executive officers
would be entitled to absolute immunity under special circumstances. It stated that
"federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for un-
constitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an
exemption of that scope." 77 Recognizing that "there are some officials whose special
functions require a full exemption from liability," '78 the Court held that executive
officers exercising essentially judicial and prosecutorial functions are entitled to
absolute immunity .7
Until Nixon v. Fitzgerald,8" however, the Court did not extend absolute immu-
nity to a federal executive officer except when the officer was exercising essentially
judicial or prosecutorial functions. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald the Court held that the
President is entitled to absolute immunity as "a functionally mandated incident of the
President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of
powers and supported by our history."- 81 In Harlow, however, the Court held that the
same reasons underlying its denial of absolute immunity to a cabinet officer in Butz
required its denial to presidential aides of a blanket protection for their actions.82 The
Court stated:
Having decided in Butz that members of the Cabinet ordinarily enjoy only qualified
immunity from suit, we conclude today that it would be equally untenable to hold absolute
immunity an incident of the office of every Presidential subordinate based in the White
House. Members of the Cabinet are direct subordinates of the President, frequently with
greater responsibilities, both to the President and to the Nation, than White House staff.
The considerations that supported our decision in Butz apply with equal force to this case.
It is no disparagement of the offices held by petitioners to hold that Presidential aides, like
members of the Cabinet, generally are entitled only to a qualified immunity.8 3
The Court did not rule out the possibility that on remand Harlow and Butterfield
could establish entitlement to absolute immunity,84 but the Court suggested a narrow
range of discretionary executive functions that might qualify for this protection. The
Court observed that "[flor aides entrusted with discretionary authority in such sensi-
tive areas as national security or foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be
justified to protect the unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national
interest."85
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger contended that Butz was distinguishable from
Harlow because "[a] senior Presidential aide works more intimately with the Presi-
75. Freed, supra note 5, at 550.
76. Id. (footnote omitted).
77. 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).
78. Id. at 508.
79. Id. at 511-17.
80. 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
81. Id. at 2701.
82. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2733-34 (1982).
83. Id. at 2734.
84. Id. at 2736.
85. Id. at 2735.
[Vol. 44:943
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
dent on a daily basis than does a Cabinet officer, directly implementing Presidential
decisions literally from hour to hour." 8 6 The Court, however, rejected this distinction
between the cases, noting, "In recent years . . . such men as Henry Kissinger and
James Schlesinger have served in both Presidential advisory and Cabinet positions.
Kissinger held both posts simultaneously." 87 The Court considered it "impossible to
generalize about the role of 'offices' in an individual President's administration
without reference to the functions that particular officeholders are assigned by the
President." 88 Therefore, the Court refused to consider the amount of daily contact
with the President controlling.
The Harlow decision appears entirely consistent with the Court's previous de-
cisions indicating that only in rare, compelling circumstances will the Court find that
the interest in protecting the decisionmaking process of an executive officer so over-
rides the interest of a plaintiff in compensation for the violation of a constitutional
right as to warrant absolute immunity.
IV. THE COURT'S RECONCILIATION OF HARLOW AND GRAVEL V. UNITED
STATES ON THE ISSUE OF DERIVATIVE IMMUNITY
If Harlow is consistent with Butz v. Economou and other Supreme Court de-
cisions concerning discretionary-function immunities, the question remains whether
it can be reconciled with Gravel v. United States89 and other decisions of the Court
concerning derivative immunity. 90
A. Gravel v. United States
Gravel arose out of the actions of Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska in making
public the contents of the celebrated Pentagon Papers, which the Defense Department
had classified "Top-Secret." 91 On June 29, 1971, Senator Gravel, as Chairman,
convened a midnight meeting of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the
Senate Public Works Committee. During the meeting he read extensively from a copy
of the Pentagon Papers and then placed the entire forty-seven volume work into the
public record. Subsequently the press reported that Senator Gravel's aides had con-
tacted an editor of the M.I.T. Press and that Gravel himself had arranged for publica-
tion of the Pentagon Papers by Beacon Press. 92 A federal grand jury was convened to
investigate possible criminal conduct concerning the release and publication of the
Pentagon Papers. Among the witnesses subpoenaed to testify was Leonard S. Rod-
berg, an assistant to Senator Gravel. In the United States District Court, Rodberg
86. Id. at 2744 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2734 n. 14.
88. Id. at 2734-35 n.14.
89. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
90. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306
(1973). Gravel, Eastland, and Doe are discussed infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
91. 408 U.S. 606, 608 (1972). Popularly known as the "Pentagon Papers," this Defense Department study was
entitled "History of the United States Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy." Id. It had been classified as "Top
Secret-Sensitive." Id.
92. Id. at 609-10.
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moved to quash the subpoena, and Senator Gravel moved to intervene, to quash the
Rodberg subpoena, and to require the government to specify the particular questions
to be addressed to Rodberg. The Senator contended that requiring Rodberg to testify
would violate the Senator's immunity under the speech or debate clause of the United
States Constitution. 93 The district court overruled the motion to quash and to specify
questions, but entered an order prohibiting certain categories of questions.
94
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to quash, but altered the
protective order to reflect its own views of the scope of the applicable privilege.
95
Both the United States and Senator Gravel petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme
Court granted both petitions. 96 The court of appeals' ruling that the Senator's aides
could not be questioned with respect to legislative acts was among the rulings chal-
lenged by the United States. 97 The Supreme Court held, however, that "the Speech
or Debate Clause applies not only to a Member [of Congress] but also to his aides
insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by
the Member himself.''98 The Court stated the reasons for this holding as follows:
[It is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modem legislative process,
with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative concern constantly
proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help
of aides and assistants; that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the Mem-
bers' performance that they must be treated as the latter's alter egos; and that if they are
not so recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate Clause-to prevent intimida-
tion of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile
judiciary-will inevitably be diminished and frustrated. 99
In response to the United States' fear of abuses "when legislators are invested
93. Id. at 608-09.
94. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971), modified, 455 F.2d 753 (Ist Cir.), vacatedsub nom.
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The protective order entered by the district court read as follows:
(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers may be
questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and
Grounds on June 29, 1971 nor about things done by the Senator in preparation for and intimately related to said
meeting.
(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own actions on June 29, 1971 after having
been engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the extent that they were taken at the Senator's
direction either at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds or in preparation for and
intimately related to said meeting.
Id. at 938; Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 611 n.8 (1972).
95. United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753 (lst Cir.), vacated sub nom. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
The protective order was modified by the court of appeals to read as follows:
(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers may be
questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and
Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor, if the questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind the Senator's
conduct at that meeting, about any communications with him or with his aides regarding the activities of the
Senator or his aides during the period of their employment, in preparation for and related to said meeting.
(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own actions in the broadest sense, including
observations and communications, oral or written, by or to him or coming to his attention while being in-
terviewed for, or after having been engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the extent that
they were in the course of his employment.
Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 612-13 (1972).
96. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 613 (1972).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 618.
99. Id. at 616-17 (citation omitted).
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with the power to relieve others from the operation of otherwise valid civil and
criminal laws, ' 00 the Court stated, in part, as follows:
But these abuses, it seems to us, are for the most part obviated if the privilege applicable
to the aide is viewed, as it must be, as the privilege of the Senator, and invocable only by
the Senator or by the aide on the Senator's behalf, and if in all events the privilege
available to the aide is confined to those services that would be immune legislative
conduct if performed by the Senator himself. This view places beyond the Speech or
Debate Clause a variety of services characteristically performed by aides for Members of
Congress, even though within the scope of their employment. It likewise provides no
protection for criminal conduct threatening the security of the person or property of
others, whether performed at the direction of the Senator in preparation for or in execution
of a legislative act or done without his knowledge or direction. 101
Dissenting in Harlow, the Chief Justice considered Gravel's rationale for the
extension of derivative immunity to a congressional aide to mandate a similar exten-
sion of derivative immunity to presidential aides. 10 2 The Chief Justice asked, "How
can we conceivably hold that a President of the United States, who represents a vastly
larger constituency than does any Member of Congress, should not have 'alter egos'
with comparable immunity?" 10 3 He further stated: "Absent equal protection for a
President's aides, how will Presidents be free from the risks of 'intimidation . . . by
[Congress] and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary?' Under today's
holding in this case the functioning of the Presidency will inevitably be 'diminished
and frustrated." " 0 4
The Harlow majority did not contest the points made by the Chief Justice. In
response to the contention that "the rationale of Gravel mandates a similar 'de-
rivative' immunity for the chief aides of the President of the United States,"' 1 5 the
Court stated: "Petitioners' argument is not without force. Ultimately, however, it
sweeps too far. If the President's aides are derivatively immune because essential to
the functioning of the Presidency, so should the members of the Cabinet . . . be
absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative immunity in Butz." 106
The Court rested its refusal to follow Gravel on the functional approach the Court has
taken to immunity law. Stating that "the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative
functions require absolute immunity," 0 7 the Court observed that "[tihe un-
differentiated extension of absolute 'derivative' immunity to the President's aides
. . . could not be reconciled with the 'functional' approach that has characterized the
immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel itself." 108 The Court also
did not consider the absolute immunity extended to the President in Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald to be inconsistent with its "functional" approach. That immunity, the Court
100. Id. at 621.
101. Id. at 621-22 (footnote omitted).
102. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2741-44 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2742.
104. Id. at 2742-43 (citations omitted) (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972)).
105. Id. at 2734.
106. Id. (footnotes omitted).
107. Id. at 2735.
108. Id. (footnote omitted).
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stated, "derives in principal part from factors unique to his constitutional
responsibilities and station."1o9 Actions against other executive officers, including
Presidential aides, however, "generally do not invoke separation-of-powers con-
siderations to the same extent as suits against the President himself."" l0
B. The Inadequacy of Harlow's Basis for Distinguishing Gravel
The Court's broad, functional basis for distinguishing Gravel leaves several
important questions unanswered. First, the Court did not contend that the day-to-day
work of presidential aides is less critical to the President's performance of his con-
stitutional duties than the comparable work of congressional aides is to the perform-
ance of the constitutional duties of Members of Congress. Did the Court, then,
consider it acceptable, within the constraints of the separation-of-powers doctrine, to
restrain the exercise of presidential authority, despite its grant of absolute immunity
in Nixon v. Fitzgerald? And, if the Court did, what were the policy justifications for
its view? Second, the Court failed to explain its questionable observation that actions
against presidential aides "generally do not invoke separation-of-powers con-
siderations to the same extent as suits against the President himself.""' If actions
against congressional aides invoke separation-of-powers considerations sufficiently
to require the immunity extended in Gravel, then why do not actions against pres-
idential aides likewise invoke such considerations sufficiently to warrant a compar-
able extension of immunity in Harlow? Third, the Court made a significant misuse of
precedent when it stated: "If the President's aides are derivately immune because
essential to the functioning of the Presidency, so should the members of the
Cabinet . . .be absolutely immune. Yet we implicitly rejected such derivative im-
munity in Butz."112 Butz did not involve any claim of derivative immunity; while
Butz properly was used as precedent for Harlow's holding that presidential aides can
claim only qualified discretionary-function immunity, it was improperly used as
precedent on the derivative immunity issue. The question posed by Harlow, which
was not involved in Butz, is why the absolute immunity of the President should not
"derive" to the benefit of aides-be they White House staff members, cabinet
officers, or other subordinates-while the absolute immunity of Members of Con-
gress does? If presidential functions warrant absolute immunity, then, under the
rationale of Gravel, why does that immunity not logically also extend to the service
of subordinates that is "critical to the [President's] performance?"' "13
By leaving these questions unanswered, the Court's opinion gives some cogency
to the Chief Justice's argument that Harlow cannot be reconciled with Gravel on a
defensible basis. This difficulty with the opinion, however, probably results from a
more fundamental flaw in the Court's treatment of the derivative immunity issue: the
Court neither defined derivative immunity nor examined its purpose. By relying on
109. Id. at 2735 n.17.
I10. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2734 (footnote omitted).
113. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972).
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Butz for both its discretionary-function and derivative immunity holdings, the Court
overlooked their discrete functions. Only if the distinct roles of the two immunities
are identified can the proper questions concerning their applicability be addressed.
These questions were not addressed in Harlow, and, consequently, its precedential
significance is difficult to assess.
V. DERIVATIVE IMMUNITY IN HARLOW AND GRAVEL
A. Derivative Immunity Defined
Derivative immunity is a defense that long has been used to protect persons from
liability when acting in compliance with court orders valid on their face and not
clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the issuing court.114 The defense also has been used
to protect subordinate officers acting under the directives of superiors in the executive
and legislative branches of government; 1 5 in these instances, however, the contours
of the defense have not been developed as clearly as in the less complex judicial area.
This Article will propose a definition of the requirements and purpose of derivative
immunity-a task the Supreme Court has not undertaken in a comprehensive way in
its immunity decisions. The Article then will apply this definition to Gravel and
Harlow, taking the position that legitimate bases exist for reconciling these two
decisions. The Court's overly broad functional rationale masks other, more defen-
sible distinctions between the two cases. Once these distinctions are uncovered, the
Article will also identify some unanswered questions concerning the immunity of
both presidential and congressional aides.
Proper application of derivative immunity requires an understanding of its role
in the overall scheme of official immunities. Official immunities are extended to
protect the decisionmaking functions of government officers when the public interest
in effective performance of an official function is considered to outweigh the plain-
tiff's interest in civil redress for an injury. 1" 6 As previously noted, government
officers exercising judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, and "discretionary" executive
functions are protected by some degree of official immunity from civil liability.' '
It is well established that not every official decision is "discretionary." Rather,
a decision receives that designation only if deemed sufficiently important to warrant
protection.' 1 8 For the sake of brevity, in the ensuing discussion, judicial, pro-
114. See Sowle, supra note 5, at 366-68.
115. See infra notes 124-27.
116. See, e.g., Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2733 (1982); 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 61, at 1640-41.
117. See supra notes 52-79 and accompanying text; REsTAmi'rrr (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 895D (1979).
118. See, e.g., 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 61, § 29.10, at 1640-41.
The authors note:
Whenever suit is brought against an individual officer because of his official conduct, the court must
consider the practical effects of liability and make a value judgment between the social and individual benefit
from compensation to the victim, together with the wholesale deterrence of official excess, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, the evils that would flow from inhibiting courageous and independent official action,
and deterring responsible citizens from entering public life. The rule of immunity of officers for discretionary
acts, and its extension, represent a judgment that the benefits to be had from the personal liability of the
officer ... are outweighed by the evils that would flow from a wider rule of liability.
1983]
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secutorial, legislative, and "discretionary" executive functions all will be referred to
as "discretionary functions," the term denoting those official functions deemed
entitled to the protection of official immunity.
Discretionary-function immunity and derivative immunity have a shared pur-
pose: both are designed to protect the discretionary functions of government officials.
Their specific roles in service of this purpose, however, are different. The role of
discretionary-function immunity is to protect the officer who has made a "discretion-
ary" decision from liability for its consequences. The role of derivative immunity is
to protect, not the officer who made a "discretionary" decision, but the subordinate
who carried it out. Its immediate effect is to protect the subordinate; its ultimate effect
and essential purpose, however, are to protect the discretionary function of the
superior. Derivative immunity exists, then, as "a necessary corollary of the super-
ior's privilege."' 
19
The operation and purpose of derivative immunity were well described in Heine
v. Raus,120 a defamation action, as follows:
[T]he subordinate who acts with the authorization of the superior is entitled to claim the
same privilege as the superior.
If, in defamation cases, recognition of an absolute privilege for judges, legislators
and highly placed executive officers of the government, when acting in line of duty, is to
serve its intended purpose, it must extend to subordinate officials and employees who
execute the official's orders. There would be little purpose to a cloak of immunity for Mr.
Barr if Mr. Matteo were allowed to maintain an action for defamation against all of those
subordinates in his office who "published" the defamation in the course of handling and
distributing the press release. There would be no advantage in protection to a judge
against actions for defamation founded upon statements made by him in an official
opinion written for his court, if such actions could readily be maintained against his
secretary who, at his direction, typed and transmitted the opinion, or against the clerk of
the court who published it. If the circumstances impose a compelling moral obligation
upon the superior to defend and indemnify the subordinates, immunization of the superior
alone from direct defamation actions would be a useless formalism.
Recognition of an absolute privilege of the subordinate by attribution of the superior
thus appears to be a necessary corollary of the superior's privilege. It is generally recog-
nized that an agent, acting within the scope of his authority, does have whatever privilege
the principal would have enjoyed if he had acted for himself. The principle is applicable in
defamation actions and, if an authorized agent would have been privileged, subsequent
ratification confers the privilege upon an unauthorized agent. 121
As stated in Heine, one objective of derivative immunity is to prevent the
inhibition of the superior's exercise of discretion that would result from placing on
Id. See also Judge Medina's opinion in Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963).
There is no litmus paper test to distinguish acts of discretion . . . , and to require a finding of "discretion"
would merely postpone, for one step in the process of reasoning, the determination of the real question-is the
act complained of the result of a judgment or decision which it is necessary that the Government official be free
to make without fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious suits and alleged personal liability?
Id.
119. Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785, 790 (4th Cir. 1968).
120. 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1968).
121. Id. at 790-91 (footnotes omitted). In support of the agency principles mentioned in the last paragraph of this
quotation, the court cited RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 345 & comment e (1958).
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the superior the "compelling moral obligation" to defend or indemnify a subordinate
subjected to a civil action for executing the superior's orders. It should be noted, too,
that if public funds are available for the defense or indemnification of a public officer
sued for an act performed in the course of his official duties,' 22 the superior still
might be reluctant to risk the need for this use of public money. Another objective is
to protect the exercise of discretion of the superior from refusals of subordinates to
execute decisions out of fear of civil liability and from delays in execution of de-
cisions while the subordinate determines whether it would be "safe" to carry out the
order.' 23 Absent derivative immunity, the discretionary authority of the superior
would be diluted; in effect, it would be shared with and diffused among all those
charged with execution.
Case law on derivative immunity and logical deductions from its purpose of
protecting the discretionary authority of the defendant's superior indicate that there
are four requirements a defendant must meet to establish entitlement to derivative
immunity. First, the defendant's conduct in question must have been ordered, di-
rected, or approved in advance by the defendant's superior. 124 Second, the defendant
must have acted within the scope of his authority when he engaged in that conduct. 125
Third, the conduct must be such that the superior would have been entitled to immu-
nity if he had engaged in the conduct himself. 126 Fourth, extension of derivative
122. Provision is often made for governmental indemnification of public employees sued for acts performed in the
course of their official duties. See Comm. ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATOR-
NEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE TORT LIABILITY o GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICERS (1979); Freed, supra
note 5, at 564 n.182.
123. See, e.g., Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976). The court
asserted:
At the least, a receiver who faithfully and carefully carries out the orders of his appointing judge must share the
judge's absolute immunity. To deny him this immunity would seriously encroach on the judicial immunity
already recognized by the Supreme Court .... It would make the receiver a lightning rod for harassing
litigation aimed at judicial orders. In addition to the unfairness of sparing the judge who gives an order while
punishing the receiver who obeys it, a fear of bringing down litigation on the receiver might color a court's
judgment in some cases; and if the court ignores the danger of harassing suits, tensions between receiver and
judge seem inevitable.
Id.; see also Potter v. LaMunyon, 389 F.2d 874, 877-78 (10th Cir. 1968) (noting "the obvious confusion in the
administration of justice that would follow if ... officers were called upon to review the legality of court orders at the
risk of personal liability"); Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 303, 318 (1959).
124. See, e.g., Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1255 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 911 (1981)
("Because the FBI appellees, all subordinates of the Attorney General, engaged in the challenged course of conduct
entirely at his direction, it is appropriate in this case that their immunity should flow from his."); Kermit Constr. Corp. v.
Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (lst Cir. 1976) ("[A] receiver who faithfully and carefully carries out the
orders of his appointing judge must share thejudge's absolute immunity."); Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1968).
In Heine the defendant's answer to a slander complaint alleged that he "acted under the instructions of the CIA when he
'warned' his fellow Legionaires that Heine was a Soviet agent." Id. at 787. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's holding "that the absolute governmental privilege was available to a government employee ... who faithfully
executed his instructions, as to one of higher authority exercising discretionary functions within the outer perimeter of his
authority." Id. at 788 (footnote omitted). The court went on to state,
We conclude that the absolute privilege is available to Raus if his instructions were issued with the approval of
the Director or of a subordinate authorized by the Director, in the subordinate's discretion, to issue such
instructions, or if the giving of the instructions was subsequently ratified and approved by such an official.
Id. at 791.
125. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 507 (1975): Doe v. MeMillan, 412
U.S. 306, 312 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628-29 (1972); Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785,790 (4th Cir.
1968).
126. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 507 (1975) ("Here the complaint
alleges that the 'Subcommittee members and staff caused the ... subpoena to be issued .... Since the Members are
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immunity to the subordinate must be necessary and appropriate to protect the discre-
tionary authority of the superior; that is, the immunity must have been "del-
egable." 2 7
All these requirements appear to be met in the cases in which the Supreme Court
has extended derivative immunity-Gravel,128 Doe v. McMillan, 129 and Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund.130 One important area of uncertainty exists,
however. Although the first requirement-that the conduct in question was ordered,
directed, or approved in advance by the superior-appears to be met in these
cases, 13 1 the Supreme Court has not expressly made it a condition for derivative
immune because the issuance of the subpoena is 'essential to legislating,' their aides share that immunity."); Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973) ("Of course, to the extent that they serve legislative functions, the performance of
which would be immune conduct if done by Congressmen, these officials [the Public Printer and Superintendent of
Documents] enjoy the protection ofthe Speech and Debate Clause."); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,618 (1972)
("[Tihe Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the latter
would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself.").
127. See the justification for extending derivative immunity in Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972), quoted in the
text, infra, at note 145. Cf. Heine, 399 F.2d 785, 793 (4th Cir. 1968) (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting). Opposing
the extension of derivative immunity made by the majority, Justice Craven argued:
I do not believe the Supreme Court in Barr intended that the immunity there recognized should extend to
intentional defamation as an instrument of governmental policy. But if I am wrong about that, I suggest that a
rule must be fashioned to limit the exercise of intentional defamation to responsible officers and officials. To
immunize millions of government subordinate employees from liability for intentionally slandering private
persons upon their mere explanation that they were told to do it, and the assertion that it was within the scope of
employment, destroys, in my opinion, the balance that was struck in Barr. If the CIA must defame someone in
order to protect national security, it seems to me it could be done more effectively by the Director himself rather
than a secret underling-and with far less danger to a free society.
Id.
See also Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979). cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981), in which the court
rejected a defense of "derivative absolute immunity," but extended qualified immunity to the defendant FBI agents on the
basis of the "well established rule that federal law enforcement officers are entitled only to qualified 'or good faith'
immunity." Id. at 1216. For a criticism of this holding, see Sowle, supra note 5, at 373 n.167.
128. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
129. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
130. 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
131. For a discussion of Gravel on this requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 140-42.
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), was an action against the Chairman of the Senate
Subcommittee on Internal Security, nine other Senators, and the Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee, brought to enjoin
implementation of a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Subcommittee. The Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals
decision that held judicial review available to prevent implementation of the subpoena. The Court held that the defendants'
actions "are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution ... and are therefore immune from judicial
interference." Id. at 501, rev'g 488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Regarding the Chief Counsel, the Court stated:
Here the complaint alleges that the "Subcommittee members and staff caused the ... subpoena to be
issued ... under the authority of Senate Resolution 366 .... " The complaint thus does not distinguish
between the activities of the Members and those of the Chief Counsel. Since the Members are immune because
the issuance of the subpoena is "essential to legislating," their aides share that immunity.
Id. at 507 (citations omitted). It is clear that the actions of the Chief Counsel that the plaintiffs sought to enjoin were
actions ordered, directed, or approved by the Subcommittee.
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), was an action for damages and an injunction growing out of the publication
of a report of a subcommittee of the House Committee on the District of Columbia concerning the D.C. public school
system. The report contained "copies of absence sheets, lists of absentees, copies of test papers, and documents relating
to disciplinary problems of certain specifically named students." Id. at 308 (footnote omitted). Among the defendants
were the Chairman and members of the House Committee on the District of Columbia, several members of the Committee
staff, and a consultant and an investigator for the Committee. Id. at 309. The Court stated:
[lit is plain to us that the complaint in this case was barred by the Speech or Debate Clause insofar as it sought
relief from the Congressmen-Committee members, from the Committee staff, from the consultant, or from the
investigator, for introducing material at Committee hearings that identified particular individuals, for referring
the report that included the material to the Speaker of the House, and for voting for publication of the report.
Id. at 312. The Court did not discuss specifically what conduct of the Committee staff members was at issue. The
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immunity. Gravel can even be interpreted as allowing derivative immunity on the
basis of the superior's subsequent ratification of the subordinate's conduct. 132 The
requirement of a prior order, direction, or approval, however, appears essential if the
immunity is to serve its intended purpose of protecting the discretionary functions of
the superior. It should be insufficient that the conduct of the subordinate was "au-
thorized" in the broad sense that it was within the scope of his authority or that it was
ratified by the superior after the fact. If the conduct at issue was based solely on an
exercise of the defendant's judgment, then the proper question to ask is whether the
defendant's decision should be protected by discretionary-function immunity.
33
complaint, however, alleged that D.C. school officials had given the pertinent documents to the Committee investigator,
who in turn gave them to the Committee consultant responsible for the investigation and for the preparation of the report.
The consultant allegedly caused the documents to be included in a draft of the Committee report, and the defendant House
members approved the report for publication. Joint Appendix at 8, Doe v. MeMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). Although the
two subordinates may have acted on their own judgment in collecting the material and drafting the report, the allegedly
tortious conduct in question was publication of the report. Any publication that occurred by its introduction at Committee
hearings would have been approved when the chairman accepted it for introduction. Further publication was approved
when the Committee voted to adopt the report and to approve it for publication. The complaint failed to allege that other
Committee staff members named as defendants did anything. Brief for Defendants Opposing the Petition for Certiorari at
8 n.10, Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
132. Gravel specifically held that "the Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a Member but also to his aides
insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself." 408 U.S.
606, 618 (1972). It further stated that "the privilege applicable to the aide [must be viewed] as the privilege of the
Senator, and invocable only by the Senator or by the aide on the Senator's behalf .... "Id. at 621-22 (footnote omitted).
Because the Court did not state that prior authorization by the Senator was necessary, this language could be interpreted as
allowing derivative immunity on the basis of subsequent ratification. If the opinion is read narrowly in light of the facts of
the case, however, this interpretation would seem overly broad. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
It should be noted that in Heine the court of appeals expressly stated that ratification would be sufficient to confer
derivative immunity. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
133. It may not always be easy to determine whether the defendant's conduct was based solely on an exercise of his
own judgment or was ordered, directed, or approved in advance by the defendant's superior. In resolving this question,
however, attention should be focused on the specific conduct at issue in the case.
An interesting case illustrating this point is Grossman v. McKay, 384 F. Supp. 99 (D. Md. 1974). Grossman was a
defamation action against a development specialist in the Training and Education Branch of the Office of Personnel
Management at the National Institute of Health (NIH). The defendant, McKay, was responsible for developing, planning,
coordinating, and evaluating clerical training courses and had the duty to discuss training techniques with other govern-
ment training professionals to make fair and accurate evaluation of these courses. The plaintiff, Grossman, wrote McKay
a letter seeking consideration of his shorthand course for NIH employees. McKay made the statement in question about
Grossman based on information she received during reference checks with other government agencies, and she made the
statements to a government employee whose name the plaintiff had given to her as a reference. The court held that McKay
was absolutely immune under either Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), or Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir.
1968). The court stated as follows:
Defendant McKay's activities are viewed by the Court as emanating from either a discharge of mandatory
duties or premised on the sound exercise of discretionary authority.
. . . [D]efendant McKay's activities may be viewed as discretionary. She is required to make a decision as
to whether or not she should recommend to her superiors a particular course. She alone is vested with this duty,
and it is upon her recommendation that the Office of Personnel Management acts when it accepts or rejects an
offer of training services. The recommendation itself is contingent upon the information she obtains as the result
of conversing with other government training specialists. The reciprocal sharing of this information is inextric-
ably interwoven in the entire process.
While defendant's duties or activities may readily be viewed as discretionary, the type of inquiry and
interchange she engaged in while evaluating the Quickhand course could with even more justification be viewed
as a mandatory activity. As has been clearly demonstrated, her duties emanate from express congressional and
administrative mandates. Whether one views her performance of these duties as being required of her by law by
virtue of the process of delegation and redelegation. or the result of instructions or directions by her superiors, or
even acts subsequently ratified by those superiors, is not controlling, What she did may come under some or all
of these heads. The extension of the privilege to defendant in this case is not dependent upon rigid formulae.
What is important is that the policies from which such terms and concepts derive be served. If the
congressional policy of procuring qualified, superior training courses for government employees is to be carried
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Only if the subordinate's conduct was ordered, directed, or approved in advance by
his superior is the superior's discretionary authority at stake in the claim against the
subordinate. Absent the superior's prior exercise of judgment concerning the conduct
alleged to be wrongful, the subordinate's liability would place no "compelling moral
obligation"' 34 on the superior to defend or indemnify the subordinate, nor would it
threaten future refusals of subordinates to execute the superior's decisions or delays
in execution while the subordinate determined whether execution would be
"safe." , 135
Analysis of Gravel and Harlow in light of the above examination of the require-
ments and purpose of derivative immunity suggests that derivative immunity was
properly extended in Gravel and properly withheld in Harlow. Questions remain,
however, about the proper limits on the precedential effects of Harlow regarding both
presidential and congressional aides.
policy of procuring qualified, superior training courses for government employees is to be carried out, then the Courts
must make certain that those persons on whom is laid the burden of assuring such results be allowed to perform their duties
free from concern as to "damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those duties-suits which would consume
time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreciably
inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government."
384 F. Supp. 99, 109-10 (D. Md. 1974) (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)).
Although the court's analysis of discretionary-function immunity was well handled in Grossman, the court simply
should have rejected any claim of derivative immunity under Heine. The proper derivative immunity question was not
whether McKay's duties mandated "the type of inquiry and interchange she engaged in while evaluating the Quickhand
course, " id., but whether her defamatory statements about Grossman had been ordered, directed, or approved in advance
by her superior. There is no indication from the facts of the case that they were. The only proper remaining issues,
therefore, were whether McKay's decision to make these statements was "discretionary"-that is, whether it was
deserving of protection-and whether the statements were made within the scope of her authority. The court gave proper
consideration to both of these questions. See id. at 110-1 1.
134. Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785, 790 (4th Cir. 1968).
135. One might suggest that derivative immunity should apply only to "ministerial acts." Indeed its genesis appears
to lie in its application to persons exercising purely ministerial functions, who would not qualify for discretionary-function
immunity. See Sowle, supra note 5, at 365-68. But the suggestion does not withstand analysis in light of the purpose of
derivative immunity to protect the discretionary functions of the superior. Derivative immunity may be appropriate to
serve that purpose, even when the subordinate's acts were discretionary in the sense that they would entitle him to claim
qualified discretionary-function immunity.
For example, in Doe v. MeMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), the Court appropriately extended absolute derivative
immunity to a committee employee who probably would have been entitled to claim qualified discretionary-function
immunity for his alleged conduct. (See the facts alleged in Doe set forth supra note 131.) The plaintiff brought an action
for invasion of privacy growing out of the publication of a House subcommittee report. One defendant was the House
subcommittee consultant responsible for the investigation and preparation of the draft report adopted by the subcommittee.
It seems likely that the consultant would have been entitled to claim qualified discretionary-function immunity because of
the importance of the decisionmaking functions involved in the investigation and selection of materials for the report. Cf.
Benford v. American Broadcasting Cos., 502 F. Supp. 1148, 1156-58 (D. Md. 1980) (Defendant staff members of a
congressional investigating team were not entitled to absolute derivative immunity, because their acts were not "legisla-
tive." They were, however, entitled to claim qualified immunity if their acts were within the scope of their authority.
"There is no rational reason to afford executive investigators greater protection than members of the legislative branch."
id. at 1159.). Despite the consultant's probable exercise of discretionary functions, however, the extension of absolute
derivative immunity appears appropriate in Doe because it was necessary to protect the legislative functions of the
members of the House subcommittee who accepted the report and voted for its publication. Absent the absolute derivative
immunity of the consultant, the responsible subcommittee members might have felt an obligation to defend or indemnify
the employee when he was named a defendant in the suit for invasion of privacy, or they might have been reluctant to risk
publication of future reports that could result in the use of public funds to defend or indemnify an employee. In addition, a
committee staff member might hesitate to carry out an assignment to investigate and report in a manner having maximum
utility to the committee. He naturally would be reluctant to relay any material that might subject him to a lawsuit if the
committee, in the exercise of its own judgment, decided to accept and publish the report. The committee members'
discretion thus would be restrained by the need for the employee to judge, not what might be of maximum use to the
committee, but what might subject him to legal action.
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B. The Applicability of Derivative Immunity in Gravel
It should be noted that the issue in Gravel was derivative testimonial immunity
rather than derivative immunity from liability for civil damages. Quite properly,
however, the Court in Harlow did not distinguish Gravel on that basis. The speech or
debate clause provides both testimonial immunity and immunity from civil damages
liability for "legislative acts,"'13 6 and the Court has made no significant distinctions
regarding the scope of the two kinds of immunity that would affect the use of
testimonial derivative immunity as precedent in an action for civil damages. 137 In-
deed, the Court used Gravel as precedent for the scope of derivative immunity from
civil damages liability in Doe v. McMillan.1
38
All four of the derivative immunity requirements set forth above' 39 appear to
have been met in Gravel. First, it seems clear that the actions of Rodberg that the
Court protected from grand jury scrutiny were actions ordered, directed, or approved
in advance by Senator Gravel. The Court's modification of the order entered by the
court of appeals did not expressly incorporate this requirement, 4 0 but it is clear from
the record that Rodberg had worked closely with Gravel in preparation for the sub-
committee meeting. 141 Indeed Senator Gravel asserted, in his Motion to Intervene in
the grand jury proceedings against Rodberg, that all acts performed by Rodberg were
under Gravel's "direction and control."' 142 Satisfaction of the first requirement dem-
onstrates that extension of derivative immunity in Gravel served its intended purpose
136. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973); Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972).
137. That is not to say, however, that the scope of testimonial and evidentiary immunities, on the one hand, and civil
damages immunity, on the other, are always the same. Compare Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2705 (1982)
(extending "absolute Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within the 'outer perimeter' of his official
responsibility") with United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). In United States v. Nixon the Court reasoned as
follows:
[Wlhen the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality [and does not involve a claim of need to protect military or
diplomatic secrets], it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administra-
tion of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Id. at 713. The Court upheld the power of the district court to issue a subpoena duces tecum against the President directing
him to produce tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aides and advisers for use in connection
with a pending criminal proceeding. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald the Court stated that it "'has recognized ... that there is a
lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than ... in criminal prosecutions." 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2704 n.37 (1982)
(citations omitted); see also Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.
1974), discussed infra note 191.
138. 412 U.S. 306 passim (1973).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
140. Referring to the order entered by the court of appeals, see supra note 95, the Court stated:
Because the Speech or Debate Clause privilege applies both to Senator and aide, it appears to us that
paragraph one of the order, alone, would afford ample protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any
witness, including Rodberg: (1) concerning the Senator's conduct, or the conduct of his aides, at the June 29,
1971, meeting of the subcommittee; (2) concerning the motives and purposes behind the Senator's conduct, or
that of his aides, at that meeting; (3) concerning communications between the Senator and his aides during the
term of their employment and related to said meeting or any other legislative act of the Senator; (4) except as it
proves relevant to investigating possible third-party crime, concerning any act, in itself not criminal, performed
by the Senator or by his aides in the course of their employment, in preparation for the subcommittee hearing.
408 U.S. 606, 628-29 (1972) (footnote omitted).
141. See Note, The Speech or Debate Clause Protection of Congressional Aides, 91 YALE L.J. 961, 962 (1982)
(citing United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 937 (D. Mass. 1971)).
142. Motion to Intervene, Record, Joint Appendix at 1, Gravel, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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of protecting the discretionary (here legislative) functions of Rodberg's superior,
Senator Gravel. Second, the Court extended derivative immunity from inquiry only
with regard to actions of Rodberg taken within the scope of his employment.143
Third, the Court extended immunity to Rodberg only from "'inquiry into things done
by Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant which would have been legislative
acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally.'" 144 Last, the
Court expressly determined that extension of derivative immunity to legislative aides
was necessary and appropriate to protect the legislative functions of Members of
Congress that the speech or debate clause was designed to protect. The Court stated:
Both [the court of appeals and the district court below] recognized what the Senate of the
United States urgently presses here: that it is literally impossible, in view of the com-
plexities of the modem legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in session and
matters of legislative concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to per-
form their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; that the day-to-day
work of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance that they must be treated as
the latter's alter egos; and that if they are not so recognized, the central role of the Speech
or Debate Clause-to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and
accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary-will inevitably be diminished and
frustrated. 1
45
It would be difficult to quarrel with the determination that the assistance of aides
is essential to the Members' adequate performance of their legislative tasks. This
broad statement about the importance of the work of aides and the need to treat them
as "alter egos" of Members, however, must be read in the context of the whole
decision. Specifically, there is no determination in Gravel that aides' actions not
meeting all the requirements of derivative immunity would be protected by the speech
or debate clause. What protection, if any, aides should receive beyond that of de-
rivative immunity will be discussed in a subsequent section of this Article. 146
C. The Inapplicability of Derivative Immunity in Harlow
Analysis of Harlow in light of the requirements and purpose of derivative im-
munity set forth above 47 demonstrates that the Court's rationale for denying de-
rivative immunity was inapposite. The Court failed to draw a distinction where there
is a difference. Instead of examining the discrete operation and purpose of derivative
immunity, the Court simplistically employed the same rationale for denying de-
rivative absolute immunity that it used for denying absolute discretionary-function
immunity. Instead of asking what effect denial of derivative immunity might have on
the discretionary authority of the President, the Court asked only what effect denial
might have on the discretionary functions of White House aides. "8
Examination of the decision and record in Harlow, however, suggests that there
143. See the Court's modification of the court of appeals order, supra note 140.
144. 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (quoting United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 937-38 (D. Mass. 1971)).
145. 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972) (citation omitted).
146. See infra text subpart VI (B).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
148. See 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2734-35 (1982).
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were legitimate bases the Court could have used to distinguish Gravel and withhold
derivative immunity in Harlow. This analysis is complicated by the failure of the
defendants to make the best argument available to them for the application of de-
rivative immunity; if the Court failed to present a cogent analysis of the derivative
immunity issue, the blame may be placed at least in part on the defendants.
Two very distinct arguments, on very different levels of significance, can be
made to support the conclusion that the defendants in Harlow were not entitled to
derivative immunity. Doubt about the precedential effect of Harlow exists in part
because it is impossible to tell whether in the future the Court might interpret Harlow
in one or the other of these lights (if, indeed, either).
The first argument supporting the conclusion that the defendants were not enti-
tled to derivative immunity grows out of the defendants' arguments, which would
mandate the conclusion that the first requirement was unsatisfied. The defendants did
not claim that their conduct in connection with the Fitzgerald matter was ordered,
directed, or approved in advance by the President; to the contrary, they claimed that
their conduct was based solely on the exercise of their own independent judg-
ments. 14 9 In arguing for derivative immunity, the defendants failed to distinguish
between the roles of discretionary-function and derivative immunity in protecting the
discretionary authority of public officials. In effect, acceptance of their derivative
immunity argument would have resulted in absolute immunity of senior White House
aides for all of their discretionary functions. Once the Court decided that the general
duties of White House aides were not "special functions" warranting absolute
discretionary-function immunity under Butz, 150 the defendants' derivative immunity
argument was bound to fail on its own terms.
The defendants relied upon Eastland, Doe, and Gravel,'5' but without recogniz-
ing that in each of those cases the specific aide's conduct at issue had been ordered,
directed, or approved in advance by a Member of Congress or a congressional
committee. 152 The defendants argued that "senior Presidential aides . . . should be
derivatively accorded the same absolute immunity as the President, because the
functions they perform are 'essential' to the President's discharge of his constitutional
duties."' 5 3 They broadly claimed that "those who directly advise the President in the
performance of his public duties or who are directly and intimately involved in the
discharge of those duties" require the protection of derivative absolute immunity. '5 4
Finally, the defendants quoted Mr. Justice Harlan's statement in Barr v. Matteo155
that
149. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit at
2-9, Harlow (No claim is made in the defendants' "'Statement of the Case" that any of their conduct was ordered,
directed, or approved in advance by the President.); Brief for Respondent on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit at 23, Harlow ("[Nieither petitioner claims to have received a
Presidential order to act in this matter; on the contrary, both deny any consultation with the President concerning this
case.").
150. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2733-34, 2735-36 (1982).
151. See Petitioners' Brief at 28-29, Harlow.
152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
153, See Petitioners' Brief at 29, Harlon (emphasis added).
154. Petitioners' Brief at 30, Harlow.
155. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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[t]he complexities and magnitude of governmental activity have become so great that
there must of necessity be a delegation and redelegation of authority as to many functions,
and we cannot say that these functions become less important simply because they are
exercised by officers of lower rank in the executive hierarchy.1
56
This statement, however, is irrelevant to a claim of derivative immunity. It was made
in support of a plurality decision (not since overturned by the Court157) extending
absolute discretionary-function immunity to the Acting Director of the Office of Rent
Stabilization in a defamation action. Barr held that, in a common-law tort action, a
federal officer exercising a discretionary function within the outer perimeter of his
authority was entitled to absolute immunity even though he was not a "high-
ranking" official. Misapplication of the above-quoted statement from Barr as a
rationale for derivative immunity would have unfortunate consequences in a Bivens
action. As previously noted, the Court in Butz distinguished Barr and held that
federal executive officials charged with constitutional violations are entitled to only
qualified discretionary-function immunity. 5 8 The vindication of not only private, but
also public interests in constitutional tort actions justifies this lower level of official
protection. 159
Thus, the defendants' arguments for derivative immunity were overly broad and
lacked any claim that their conduct was ordered, directed, or approved in advance by
the President. As previously observed, however, unless the superior from whom
derivative immunity is claimed has exercised his own discretion over the sub-
ordinate's conduct in question, the superior's discretionary authority is not at stake in
the action against the subordinate.
Harlow, then, can be reconciled with Gravel on the basis that the Harlow
defendants failed to satisfy the first requirement of derivative immunity. Viewed in
this light, the Court's purported holding that presidential aides are not entitled to
claim derivative immunity is far broader than it need have been and was based on the
mistaken view set forth by the defendants-that derivative immunity is designed to
protect the discretionary functions of a subordinate. In this light, the Court's holding
can be viewed as weak and possibly as easily assailable in a future case in which a
presidential aide could satisfy the first three derivative immunity requirements.
The second argument supporting the conclusion that the defendants were not
entitled to derivative immunity is more fundamental and far reaching than the first.
This argument requires that Harlow be considered in light of the best theory the
defendants could have advanced to satisfy the first requirement of derivative im-
munity.
The best argument available to the defendants for satisfaction of the first require-
ment derives from the plaintiff's use of a conspiracy theory. 160 The defendants could
have argued that, if the facts were viewed in accordance with the conspiracy theory,
those facts would mandate a finding that the first requirement was satisfied.' 6 ' The
156. Id. at 573 (footnote omitted), quoted in Petitioners' Brief at 30 n.12, Harlow.
157. See Butz, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (distinguishing Barr, 360 U.S. 564 (1959)).
158. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 164-71.
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second and third requirements would seem easily satisfied, as will be discussed
below. 162 Denial of derivative immunity, then, could be predicated only on the
failure of the defendants to satisfy the fourth requirement: denial would have to be
based on the fundamental argument that the discretionary authority of the President
should be restricted by the denial of derivative immunity.
163
In connection with the first requirement, the plaintiff claimed that Nixon, Har-
low, and Butterfield conspired to arrange the elimination of Fitzgerald's job and to
obstruct any potential rehiring. 164 The plaintiffs theory was that "various con-
spirators took different actions at different times to further the injurious conduct" and
that the plaintiff could establish liability by establishing "an 'affirmative link' be-
tween the injurious conduct and 'the adoption of any plan or policy by petitioners-
express or otherwise-showing their authorization or approval of such mis-
conduct.'" 65 The plaintiff contended that from the evidence amassed, "a jury could
quite properly conclude that the supposed 'office reorganization' was in fact a pretext
for a retaliatory termination of respondent's employment and that petitioners know-
ingly supported, approved, and furthered that termination effort."'
166
The plaintiff claimed the evidence showed that Nixon himself made the decision
to terminate Fitzgerald's employment, that Harlow had given advice to Nixon favor-
ing termination, and that Harlow's "advice to President Nixon undoubtedly played a
part in the presidential decision to terminate plaintiff's employment." 167 The plaintiff
also claimed that Harlow had various conversations with the Secretary of the Air
Force on the Fitzgerald matter in which he promoted or endorsed Fitzgerald's dis-
missal and that it could reasonably be inferred that in one of these conversations they
"discussed what story the Air Force would tell Congress to justify Fitzgerald's
removal."' 168 The plaintiff thus contended that Nixon had made the decision to
terminate Fitzgerald's employment and that Harlow's conduct in pursuance of the
plan's objectives was approved by Nixon.
To show Butterfield's participation in the conspiracy, the plaintiff relied solely
upon oral and written communications from Butterfield to other members of the
White House staff. One memorandum was circulated in which Butterfield claimed to
have learned that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on some "shoddy
purchasing practices" by exposing those practices to public view. 169 The plaintiff
contended that this memorandum showed that Butterfield "had commenced efforts to
secure Fitzgerald's retaliatory dismissal."' 70 Another memorandum recommended
that Fitzgerald not be reemployed, stating: "Let's let him bleed for awhile. He is
100% disloyal-not without expertise in his field, but nonetheless 100% idsloyal
162. See infra text accompanying notes 172-76.
163. See infra text accompanying notes 177-80.
164. Respondent's Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit at 3, Harlow.
165. Id. at 4 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 432 U.S. 362, 371 (1976)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 11.
168. Id. at 10.
169. Id. at 12; 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2731 (1982).
170. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2731 (1982).
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[sic]." 17 1 Although the plaintiff did not claim that these communications reached the
President, they must be viewed in light of the plaintiff's conspiracy theory. If the
plaintiff obtained a finding that the three alleged conspirators had agreed to and
approved efforts that would forward a retaliatory plan to dismiss Fitzgerald and
prevent his reemployment, that finding could include the determination that the
President had ordered, directed, or approved in advance the conduct of Harlow and
Butterfield upon which the plaintiff relied to show participation in the alleged con-
spiracy.
Of course, the defendants vigorously contested the plaintiff's conspiracy theory.
On summary judgment, however, the defendants appropriately could have argued
that, if the facts were viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, his own
theory implied that the President had ordered, directed, or approved in advance the
defendants' conduct. In this light, the Supreme Court could not have ruled that, as a
matter of law, the first requirement was not met.
The second requirement of derivative immunity-that the subordinate acted
within the scope of his authority-was contested by the parties. 172 The district court
determined that genuine issues of fact existed on this issue. 173 The Supreme Court did
not discuss the question, but remanded for resolution of the qualified immunity
issue. 174 Thus, the scope-of-authority issue was still alive on remand.
The third requirement-that the superior would have been entitled to immunity
had he himself engaged in the conduct in question-seems easily resolved in the
defendants' favor. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald175 the Court held that Nixon was absolutely
immune against the charge that he participated in the same conspiracy in which
Harlow and Butterfield allegedly participated. The Court broadly held the President
immune "from damages liability for acts within the 'outer perimeter' of his official
responsibility." 176
If factual issues remained concerning the first three requirements of derivative
immunity, rejection of such immunity as a matter of law would have required a
determination that the fourth requirement was unsatisfied-that extension of de-
rivative immunity was unnecessary or inappropriate to protect the discretionary func-
tions of the President. This determination is defensible, but only with clear
acknowledgment of its significance. If the first three requirements of derivative
immunity were met, denial of derivative immunity logically would result in a re-
straint upon the discretionary authority of the President. Denial, therefore, could be
predicted only on the desirability of this result and its acceptability under the
separation-of-powers doctrine.
If Harlow is taken at face value-if it means that presidential aides may not
171. Respondent's Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit at 13, Harlow.
172. See id. at 17-22; Petitioner's Reply Brief to Respondent's Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia at 7 n.6, Harlow; Petitioner's Brief at 3-4, 37, Harlow, Brief
for Respondent at 14, 34-37, 40-41, Harlow; Petitioners' Reply Brief at 5-7, Harlow.
173. Joint Appendix at 57a-58a, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
174. 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2739-40 (1982).
175. 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
176. Id. at 2705.
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claim derivative immunity even if they meet the first three requirements of that
defense as here interpreted-then the President's discretionary authority may be
restrained, perhaps to a significant degree. Presidential aides are entitled to qualified
immunity for their discretionary acts, and this immunity as redefined in Harlow
177
may give greater protection than before. Nevertheless, their subjection to the
possibility of having to defend against civil liability for their conduct could well result
in the consequences that derivative immunity is designed to avoid. The President's
discretionary authority may be restrained by anticipation of a "compelling moral
obligation"' 78 to defend and indemnify subordinates or by the perceived need of
subordinates to determine for themselves the legal validity of the President's
decisions. 179
Whether the Court intended to restrain the exercise of the President's discretion-
ary authority by denying derivative immunity in Harlow is unclear. On one hand, the
Court's failure to distinguish between the roles of discretionary-function and de-
rivative immunity suggests that it may not have understood in what way denial of
derivative immunity would be likely to restrain the President's exercise of his discre-
tionary authority. On the other hand, the Court made no attempt to refute the Chief
Justice's argument that derivative immunity was essential to protect the ability of the
President to carry out his constitutional duties. 18o
The question arises, then, whether it is desirable as a matter of policy and
acceptable under the separation-of-powers doctrine to place the restraints on the
President's discretionary authority that are likely to result from denial of derivative
absolute immunity to the President's subordinates. Reasonable arguments can be
made that it is.
First, if one views Nixon v. Fitzgerald's extension of absolute immunity to the
President as unwarranted,1 81 one can take comfort in the denial of derivative immun-
177. See supra note 35.
178. Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785, 790 (4th Cir. 1968).
179. The subordinates' caution in executing presidential decisions probably would be a stronger inhibition on the
President's discretion than would the "compelling moml obligation," id., to defend or indemnify. In his Harlow dissent,
the Chief Justice stated as follows:
The Executive Branch may as a matter of grace supply some legal assistance. The Department of Justice
has a long-standing policy of representing Federal officers in civil suits involving conduct performed within the
scope of their employment. In addition, the Department provides for retention of private legal counsel when
necessary. See Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the
Judiciary, Justice Department Retention of Private Legal Counsel to Represent Federal Employees in Civil
Lawsuits, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
102 S. Ct. 2727, 2743 n.7 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2742-43.
181. For critical views of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, see The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 35, at 226-32
(arguing that public policy considerations point to qualified, not absolute, presidential immunity); Note, Nixon v.
Fitzgerald: Presidential Immunity as a Constitutional Imperative, 32 CAmri. U.L. REv. 759 (1983) (extension of absolute
immunity to the President is inconsistent with the functional approach taken by the Court and is not justified on the basis of
either public policy or the separation-of-powers doctrine); Comment, Nixon v. Fitzgerald: A Justifiable Separation of
Powers Argument for Absolute Presidential Civil Damages Immunity?, 68 IOwA L. REv. 557 (1983) (supports the
qualified immunity privilege for the President, stating that the Court has abdicated its principles by allowing the President
to have absolute immunity); 68 CotNELL L. REv. 236 (1983) (supports the application of a functional analysis to the
President, stating that grant of absolute immunity was overly broad); 13 SErON HALL L. Ruv. 374 (1983) (arguing that
Nixon is broad and inflexible and supporting the functional theory of immunity). For a discussion supportive ofNixon v.
Fitzgerald, see Casenote, Absolute Presidential Immunity from Civil Damage Liability: Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 24 B.C.L.
REv. 737 (1983) (stating that absolute presidential immunity is the logical highest step in the progression of varying
immunities granted different government officials).
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ity in Harlow. An author who takes issue with Nixon v. Fitzgerald has stated as
follows:
The direct impact of Nixon is likely to be modest. Because the President rarely (if
ever) acts entirely alone, most injured parties can seek compensation from other officials
who influence or implement the offending decision. Moreover, the risk of liability will
encourage those other officials to supplement the various institutional and political checks
on presidential wrongdoing.
182
Even if one considers that Nixon v. Fitzgerald was correctly decided, however,
it is reasonable to argue that the President's absolute immunity for official acts in
most cases should be personal and nondelegable and that his authority is properly
restrained by the general denial of derivative immunity to his subordinates. The
Court's decisions granting only qualified immunity in constitutional tort actions to
persons other than the President exercising executive functions reflect its view that
the traditional interests protected by official immunity-fairness and fearless
decisionmaking' 83 -must give way in part to the competing need for redress of
personal injury and deterrence of constitutional wrongs. 184 In defending the grant of
only qualified immunity for the protection of executive functions, one commentator
has stated: "[O]ne can ask just how 'fearless' we want our officials to be. Our
tendency to take for granted the good faith and reasonableness of our officials is, in
light of recent events, probably gone forever. A little chastening of the ardor of public
officials is probably a good thing."' 85 He further stated, "It may not be too much of
an exaggeration to suggest that erosion of the presumption of official good faith and
reasonableness during the Watergate period contributed to the abandonment of abso-
lute executive immunity.' 186
If one assumes that Nixon v. Fitzgerald was correct in holding that the
separation-of-powers doctrine requires absolute immunity of the President in a Bivens
action, it does not necessarily follow that the doctrine also requires the absolute
derivative immunity of his aides, even though the denial of that immunity would, to a
degree, intrude on the authority and function of the President's office. Absent the
constraints imposed by the concept of justiciability, 8 7 the separation-of-powers doc-
trine clearly allows the Court to determine whether the President and his subordinates
have exceeded the scope of their constitutional powers.' 8 8 In United States v.
182. The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 35, at 232. The author further observes:
There is some risk that the President will act alone more frequently in an effort to shield other officials and
will thereby circumvent these compensating factors and increase the risk of ill-considered acts. However, few
significant decisions could be implemented solely by the Chief Executive.
Id. at 232 n.46.
183. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 60-79; Freed, supra note 5, at 548-51.
185. Freed, supra note 5, at 564.
186. Id. at 564 n.181.
187. For a discussion of the many faceted concept of justiciability, see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
516-19 (1969).
188. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding that President Truman
exceeded the scope of his constitutional powers when he issued an order directing his Secretary of Commerce to take
possession of and operate most of the nation's steel mills); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1974). In
United States v. Nixon the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the "judicial Power of the United States"
vested in the federal courts by Art. Ill, § 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch
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Nixon'8 9 the Court refused to recognize both a claim of presidential immunity from
judicial process and a claim that the President is the final arbiter of the scope of
executive privilege." 9 Reserving for itself the right to determine the scope of that
privilege, the Court stated, "Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic
concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the
scheme of a tripartite government."' 91 The Court weighed the competing con-
stitutional concerns against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and function of
the executive branch 92 and held that "[t]he generalized assertion of privilege must
yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial." 1
93
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald the Court again asserted that a claim of presidential immunity
requires the Court to "balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served
[by an exercise of jurisdiction over the President] against the dangers of intrusion on
the authority and function of the Executive Branch." 9 4 Although the Court upheld
the President's position, it expressly affirmed its own authority to determine the
bounds of presidential power.
In Butz the Court recognized that a Bivens action involves a charge that the
defendant official has exceeded the scope of his constitutional powers. 195 The Court
than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with
the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic
concept of the separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite
government. We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to say what the law is" with
respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
189. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
190. See supra note 188.
191. 418 U.S. 683,704 (1974). Not every claim of presidential immunity, however, has been regarded as "justici-
able." Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974), involved a
suit by a Senate select committee to enforce a subpoena duces tecum served on President Nixon for production of tape
recordings of conversations between the President and his former Counsel, John W. Dean, IIL. In an opinion by Judge
Bazelon the court refused to enforce the subpoena because
the need demonstrated by the Select Committee in the peculiar circumstances of this case, including the
subsequent and on-going investigation of the House Judiciary Committee, is too attenuated and too tangential to
its functions to permit a judicial judgment that the President is required to comply with the Committee's
subpoena.
Id. at 733. Concurring, Judge Wilkey would have held that the issue presented was "a political question and therefore not
justiciable." Id. at 734 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
The court observed that the case was
the first such case in our history [to call upon the court] to exercise the equity power ofa court at the request of a
congressional committee, in the form of a judgment that the President must disclose to the Committee records of
conversations between himself and his principal aides.
Id. at 733. For conflicting views as to the justiciability of a case asking the judiciary to resolve a dispute over executive
privilege between the legislative and executive branches, see Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1383,
1425-26, 1431-32 (1974) (opposing judicial resolution); Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the
Courts, 35 OHto ST. L.J. 1, 23, 40 (1974) (favoring judicial resolution).
192. 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) ("Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh
Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions
of each branch.").
193. Id. at 713.
194. 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2704 (1982).
195. Butz recognized that the question whether an official has exceeded the constitutional or statutory limits on his
powers is different from the question whether he acted within the "scope of his authority" for purposes of granting
absolute or qualified discretionary-function immunity. Thus, the Court stated that "[ijf any inference is to be drawn from
[Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896)] it is that the official would not be excused from liability if he failed to observe
obvious statutory or constitutional limitations on his powers or if his conduct was a manifestly erroneous application of the
statute." 438 U.S. 478, 494 (1978). The Court also stated:
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refused to extend an absolute discretionary-function immunity to executive officers as
a class because "[i]f, as the Government argues, all officials exercising discretion
were exempt from personal liability, a suit under the Constitution could provide no
redress to the injured citizen, nor would it in any degree deter federal officials from
committing constitutional wrongs."' 96 In granting absolute immunity to the Presi-
dent in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court observed the President's "unique position in
the constitutional scheme" '1 97 and stressed the consideration that, because of the
President's special visibility and vulnerability to lawsuits, the distraction from his
constitutional duties that could result from the lack of absolute immunity would be
highly detrimental to the effective operation of the executive branch of gov-
ernment. 198 It is reasonable to consider, however, that the President should have
absolute immunity to avoid detrimental distraction from his uniquely broad and
important constitutional duties, but that the interests in fairness and fearless de-
cisionmaking should give way in part to competing constitutional interests. Thus, the
Court reasonably could determine, within the confines of the separation-of-powers
doctrine, that effective operation of the executive branch of government requires
absolute immunity of the President from civil liability for constitutional wrongs, but
generally does not require that the President be insulated from a "compelling moral
obligation" 199 to defend or indemnify subordinates subjected to Bivens actions for
their execution of presidential decisions or that he be protected from the perceived
need of subordinates to judge for themselves the constitutionality of presidential
decisions for fear of civil litigation and possible liability if they are wrong. To echo
Freed, in the post-Watergate period, "one can ask just how 'fearless' we want our
[President] to be.' '20
It is also defensible generally to deny derivative immunity to presidential sub-
ordinates while extending it to judicial and legislative aides. The absolute immunity
of judges and the derivative immunity of their subordinates applies only to judicial
The liability of officials who have exceeded constitutional limits was not confronted in either Barr or
Spalding. Neither of those cases supports the Government's position. Beyond that, however, neither case
purported to abolish the liability of federal officers for actions manifestly beyond their line of duty; and if they
are accountable when they stray beyond the plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be incongruous to
hold that they may nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional rights without fear of liability.
Id. at 495.
196. 438 U.S. 478, 505 (1978).
197. 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2702 (1972).
198. The Court stated as follows:
Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with
private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government. As is the case with
prosecutors and judges-for whom absolute immunity now is established-a President must concern himself
with matters likely to "arouse the most intense feelings." Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in
precisely such cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the maximum ability to
deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his office. This concern is compelling where the officeholder
must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under our constitutional
system. Nor can the sheer prominence of the President's office be ignored. In view of the visibility of his office
and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits for
civil damages. Cognizance of this personal vulnerability frequently could distract a President from his public
duties, to the detriment not only of the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was
designed to serve.
Id. at 2703 (citations and footnotes omitted).
199. Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785, 790 (4th Cir. 1968).
200. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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functions. 20 1 Judicial discretion and independence are essential to the fair administra-
tion of justice and are constrained by controls inapplicable to the exercise of pres-
idential power.2 °2 The absolute immunity of Members of Congress and the derivative
immunity of their aides apply only to "legislative acts," not to all "official acts"
they routinely perform in carrying out their representative functions. 20 3 In Nixon v.
Fitzgerald the President's absolute immunity was held to apply to all "official acts"
within the outer perimeter of his authority.20 4 Thus, the derivative immunity of
presidential aides would result in far greater potential for abuse of constitutional
power than would such extension to judicial or congressional subordinates. 20 5 It is
201. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978) (discussing the factors determining whether an act by
a judge is a judicial act); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (recognizing "the immunity of judges from liability
for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction"); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 64 (9th Cir.
1974) (no judicial immunity to charge that justice of the peace forcibly removed the plaintiff from the courtroom, because
act charged was "not an act of a judicial nature"); Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970) ("We believe
that the pleadings in this case cannot be read as revealing that defendant Johnson was performing any judicial act during
the meeting of the Fayette County Fiscal Court," which had only legislative and administrative powers.).
202. See Butz, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).
203. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313 (1973) ("Our cases make perfectly apparent. . . that everything a
Member of Congress may regularly do is not a legislative act within the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause.");
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) ("That Senators generally perform certain acts in their official capacity
as Senators does not necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature.").
204. 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2705 (1982).
205. That is not to say, however, that derivative immunity never should be extended to presidential subordinates.
See infra text accompanying note 207.
In arguing against the defendants' claim of derivative immunity in Harlow, the plaintiff made an overly broad
contention about the potential for abuse of power if presidential aides were given derivative immunity. Referring to
Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), discussed supra note 29, the plaintiff stated as follows:
In the argument before this Court in Halperin, the Solicitor General urged that the President should be
accorded an absolute immunity from civil damage actions and that such immunity should be "derivatively"
extended to those officials "carrying out the President's orders." But, of course, a vast array of public officials
and others may be said to be engaged in carrying out and implementing the numerous executive orders,
directives, regulations and other policies which emanate from the President on virtually a daily basis. To this
respondent it appeared that the Solicitor General did not have a satisfactory answer to the vexing question of
how far down the chain of command such derivative immunity can legitimately extend. But without a clear
answer, a rule of absolute immunity for those implementing Presidential orders and policies essentially im-
munizes the entire Executive Branch from civil liability.
Respondent's Brief on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia at
22-23, Harlow. In a footnote to this statement, the plaintiff further argued as follows:
The proposed "derivative" immunity also raises the serious question of whether this Court wishes to
decree protection for all government officials who can contend, and possibly prove, that they were "simply
following orders." At Nuremberg, this nation emphatically rejected that line of defense, even in the case of
military officers carrying out orders in wartime, and respondent doubts that its resurrection in the instant context
would truly benefit the government or its citizens.
Id. at 23 n.14.
Use of the specters of immunizing "the entire Executive Branch from civil liability" and of protecting all those who
"simply [follow] orders" is dramatic overkill. First, the requirements of derivative immunity, as interpreted in this
Article, protect, not all those acting within the scope of their authority, but only those whose specific conduct in question
was ordered, directed, or approved in advance by the superior. Although a great many persons in the executive branch no
doubt implement presidential directives within the scope of their authority, probably only a small number could claim that
their specific conduct alleged to be wrongful had been ordered, directed or approved in advance by the President.
Second, the proposed requirements protect, not all those who follow the orders of a superior, but only those who do
so when the superior would have been protected had he carried out the decision himself. In the Nuremberg war crimes
trials, those who gave the orders, as well as those who carried them out, were considered war criminals. The Constitution
of the International Military Tribunal, established for the trial of war criminals of the European Axis in pursuance of the
Agreement of August 8, 1945, signed by the governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union, provided in title II, article 6, that "[Iheaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the [crimes defined in this Article] are
responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan." Article 7 provided that "[the official position
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also significant that the general denial of derivative immunity to presidential aides,
despite its extension to congressional aides, is consistent with the basic separation-of-
powers principle that the constitutional restraints upon the President's power to ex-
ecute the laws are greater than the constitutional restraints upon Congress' power to
legislate.20
6
The decision in Harlow can be defended. The flaw in Harlow is not its result,
but its rationale. If the Court did intend to deny derivative immunity as properly
defined, such denial could be justified adequately only on the basis of a frank
consideration of the desirability of restraining the discretionary authority of the Presi-
dent and its acceptability under the separation-of-powers doctrine. It is insufficient to
say, as did the Court, that the same reasons for denying absolute immunity to the
defendants for their exercise of discretionary functions require denial of their de-
rivative immunity."27
VI. QUESTIONS GENERATED BY HARLOW CONCERNING THE IMMUNITY OF
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL AIDES
A. The Problems Created by Harlow Concerning the Derivative Immunity of
Presidential Aides
of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as
freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment." Article 8 provided that "[t]he fact that the Defendant acted
pursuant to order of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if
the Tribunal determines that justice so requires." 1 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS Xi-Xii.
Third, the derivative immunity at issue in Harlow was from civil damage liability, not criminal prosecution. Clearly,
immunity from criminal charges is much narrower than immunity from civil liability. See, e.g., Gravel, 408 U.S. 606,
627-29 (1972).
Finally, even if the first three proposed requirements are met, the court should consider whether the superior's
discretionary authority warrants the protection of derivative immunity for his subordinate. This is not a "bright line" test,
but is as sound and workable as, for example, the test for "discretionary functions." See supra note 118 and accompany-
ing text.
206. See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding the constitutionality of a
federal statute limiting the President's power to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission); Weiner v. United
States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (holding that the President had no authority to remove at will a member of the War Claims
Commission, even though the War Claims Act was silent regarding removal); see also Van Alstyne, A Political and
Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REv. 116 (1974). Commenting upon a reference to
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) (holding that Congress has power to incorporate a bank), in
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 n.16 (1974), Van Alstyne made the following observations about the
"necessary and proper" clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18:
But surely the reference to McCulloch v. Maryland did not mean to read into article II an implied
equivalent of the necessary-and-proper clause which is found only in article I. Indeed, the necessary-and-proper
clause in article I itself forbids any such inference to be drawn from the silence of article II. Thus, the clause
provides in full (and note paiicularly the second half of the clause):
[Congress shall have power] to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
It would appear to be plain from this provision that insofar as some larger zone of executive privilege might by
Congress be deemed appropriate and expedient for the President to have, more generous by far than what a court
would regard as a minimal privilege indispensable to the performance of the President's express constitutional
powers (e.g., a privilege of confidentiality respecting specific troop locations during a time of military emer-
gency as an indispensable incident of his express power as Commander in Chief), the necessary-and-proper
clause permits Congress to provide for that more generous zone of privilege. But precisely because the
Constitution expressly commits all such questions of executive convenience and expediency solely to Congress
and leaves nothing to inference or implication from the silence of article II, there is no room left for any court to
analogize any broadly implied power of executive privilege from article 11 itself.
Van Alstyne, supra, at 118-19 (footnotes omitted) (emphases in original).
207. See 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2734-35 (1982).
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The Court's use of a broad "functional" rationale for distinguishing Gravel
appears too simplistic to produce an appropriate result in all cases. Its approach
would seem categorically to rule out the use of derivative immunity for executive
functions, except perhaps when national security or foreign policy is involved.
20 8
This approach, however, in some circumstances might restrain the President's discre-
tionary authority unduly, and in other circumstances, insufficiently. At one extreme,
it might result in the denial of derivative immunity to a subordinate exercising purely
ministerial functions on direct order of the President. Surely, however, every White
House secretary who transcribes and forwards presidential directives should not be
required to review the validity of his actions on pain of potential litigation. Denial of
derivative immunity in this situation not only would seem unfair to the secretary, but
also would unduly restrain the President's discretionary authority. At another ex-
treme, the Court's approach might result in the automatic extension of derivative
immunity to a subordinate acting under presidential directives solely because they
concerned national security or foreign affairs. Absolute derivative immunity in such a
case, however, should not be extended simply because of the subject matter of the
directives. A defensible decision would require consideration by both the parties and
the Court of the desirability of restraining the President's discretionary authority on
the facts of the case at hand, with due consideration to the interests in compensating
the victim of a constitutional violation and in deterring the abuse of official power.
It is uncertain, however, that the Court would adhere to its approach in a future
case involving a claim of derivative immunity by a presidential aide. Because the
Court failed in Harlow to distinguish between the operation of discretionary-function
and derivative immunity, it is conceivable that the Court would modify its approach if
an aide could distinguish Harlow by showing that the first three requirements had
been met. As discussed above, the first basis for reconciling Harlow and Gravel rests
upon the defendants' failure in Harlow to argue that the first requirement had been
met and to distinguish between the objectives of discretionary-function and derivative
immunity. 20 9 The second argument discussed above for a defensible reconciliation of
the two cases, 2 10 however, is considerably closer than the first to the Court's reason-
ing in Harlow. The second argument recognizes a "functional" rationale for denying
derivative immunity, as a general rule, to presidential subordinates, while extending
it to congressional aides. It does so, however, only on the basis of a direct determina-
tion of the desirability of restraining the President's discretionary authority by the
denial of derivative immunity to his aides in most circumstances. Although it is
impossible to predict how the Court in the future might construe Harlow on the
derivative immunity issue, the better course would be to construe it, not as a weak
precedent, easily assailed if a presidential aide could satisfy the first three require-
ments, but as a firm precedent for denying derivative immunity to presidential aides
absent a clear showing for its need.
208. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text; see also 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2735-36 n.19 (1982).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 149-59.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 160-205.
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B. The Problems Created by Harlow Concerning the Discretionary-Function Im-
munity of Congressional Aides
Flaws in Harlow's treatment of derivative immunity generate questions about its
effect on future cases involving not only presidential aides, but congressional aides as
well. The question left in doubt as to presidential aides concerns their potential
entitlement to absolute derivative immunity. The question left in doubt as to con-
gressional aides is their potential entitlement to absolute discretionary-function im-
munity. Specifically, Harlow's broad functional rationale, together with its mistaken
supposition that derivative immunity protects the discretionary authority of the sub-
ordinate, rather than the superior, could result in the inappropriate extension of
absolute immunity to congressional aides carrying out "legislative functions" within
the scope of their authority but solely in the exercise of their own judgment.
As previously noted, the Court's decisions concerning the derivative immunity
of congressional aides are consistent with the requirements for derivative immunity as
interpreted in this Article. 21 1 The Court has denied derivative immunity when the
third requirement was not satisfied-that is, when the defendant's superior would not
have been immune had he executed his decision himself.2 12 And the Court no doubt
would deny it if the second requirement was not satisfied-that is, if the defendant
was not acting within the scope of his authority.2 13 The Court has yet to consider a
case, however, in which all the requirements were met except the first, which man-
dates that the defendant's actions were ordered, directed, or approved in advance by
his superior. The Court has not expressly made this a requirement, and Gravel can be
broadly interpreted as allowing derivative immunity on the basis of subsequent
ratification.21 4 In this situation, the aide should not be held entitled to derivative
immunity, because the discretionary authority of the superior is not at stake. The
proper issues to address are whether the aide is entitled to discretionary-function
immunity, and if so, whether absolute or qualified immunity is the appropriate level
of protection.
Extended to its logical extreme, however, the flawed reasoning of Harlow
would lead to an inappropriate extension of "derivative" absolute immunity in this
situation. Harlow distinguished Gravel, not because either the first or fourth require-
ment of derivative immunity was unsatisfied, but because Harlow involved executive
rather than legislative functions.21 5 Moreover, although the first requirement was met
211. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
212. See Doe v. MeMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314-16 (1973); Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 624-29 (1972).
213. Cf. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
214. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
215. In rejecting the defendants' argument that "the rationale of Gravel mandates a similar 'derivative' immunity
for the chief aides of the President," 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2734 (1982), the Court first stated that it had "implicitly rejected
such derivative immunity in Butz," id., and then reasoned as follows:
Moreover, in general our cases have followed a "functional" approach to immunity law. We have recognized
that the judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative functions require absolute immunity. But this protection has
extended no further than its justification would warrant. In Gravel, for example, we emphasized that Senators
and their aides were absolutely immune only when performing "acts legislative in nature," and not when taking
other acts even "in their official capacity."..... The undifferentiated extension of absolute "derivative"
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in Gravel, Harlow suggested that an aide of a Member of Congress is entitled to
absolute "derivative" immunity as long as he has performed a legislative function
that would have been protected if performed by the Member himself.2" 6 .
A congressional aide, however, who performs a legislative function within the
scope of his authority, but without his act being ordered, directed, or approved in
advance by a Member of Congress, should be entitled at most to qualified im-
munity.2z 7 That the act is "functionally" legislative should be insufficient to justify
absolute immunity. Strong policy reasons for limiting protection to qualified immu-
nity are that congressional aides have great power in today's large congressional
bureaucracy and that they lack the political accountability of Members of Congress.
In opposing the extension of speech or debate clause immunity to congressional
aides "for facially legislative acts that they undertake of their own accord," a recent
Yale Law Journal Notez 18 comments on the power and size of today's congressional
bureaucracy. With thorough documentation, it states as follows:
immunity to the President's aides therefore could not be reconciled with the "functional" approach that has
characterized the immunity decisions of this Court, indeed including Gravel itself.
Id. at 2735 (citations and footnotes omitted).
216. The Court stated:
In Gravel we endorsed the view that "it is literally impossible ... for Members of Congress to perform their
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants" and that "the day-to-day work of such aides is so
critical to the Members' performance that they must be treated as the latter's alter egos .. " Having done so,
we held the Speech and Debate Clause derivatively applicable to the "legislative acts" of a Senator's aide that
would have been privileged if performed by the Senator himself.
Id. at 2734 (citations omitted).
217. It has been held that Members of Congress and congressional aides are entitled to claim qualified immunity for
acts performed within the scope of their authority but not considered "legislative acts" entitled to speech or debate clause
protection. See Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865, 881 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The inapplicability of speech or debate protection
does not foreclose Representative Passman from asserting the same qualified immunity available to other government
officials."), aff d in part and vacated in part en banc, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S.
228, 246 n.25 (1979) ("The en bane Court of Appeals did not reach [the issue whether Passman could claim qualified
immunity], and accordingly we express no view concerning its disposition by the panel."); Benford v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 502 F. Supp. 1148, 1156-58 (D. Md. 1980) (Defendant members of a congressional investigating
team were not entitled to derivative immunity under the speech or debate clause, because their acts were not "legislative";
they were, however, entitled to claim qualified immunity if their acts were within the scope of their authority.); see also
McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277, 1291 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane) ("[T]here may be available to [the
defendant] a qualified defense to the damages action (not an absolute immunity from suit) of 'good faith and reasonable
belief in the validity of the search.'").
The issue posed in the text, however, differs from that considered in these cases. The former issue involves
performance by the aide of a "legislative act," while the latter does not.
218. Note, supra note 141. This Note focuses upon the holding in Gravel that "the privilege applicable to the aide
[must be viewed] as the privilege of the Senator . . . invocable only by the Senator or by the aide on the Senator's
behalf. ... 408 U.S. 606, 621-22 (1972) (footnote omitted). The Note considered this holding too broad, because it
"permits aides to assert speech or debate clause protection directly, subject only to a Member's veto." Note, supra note
141, at 962. The Note considered that "by affording aides the opportunity to invoke immunity for acts they undertake on
their own accord, the Gravel holding invites abuse." Id. The Note proposes that an aide should be entitled to immunity
under the clause only when "(a) that immunity is invoked by the Member, and (b) the Member's motion to dismiss a suit,
or to quash a subpoena, includes an affirmation that the aide was in fact acting on the Member's behalf." Id. at 972.
Although this proposal has merit, it appears to allow immunity to be conferred by ratification, contrary to the position
taken in this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 132-35. Moreover, the Note's proposal would leave unprotected
an aide with a legitimate claim to immunity if the Member had died or was otherwise unable to invoke the immunity. The
Note is correct in stating that derivative immunity should not protect aides "for acts they undertake on their own." See
text subpart VI (B). It would appear, however, that sufficient insurance against such use of derivative immunity is
provided if the aide must establish by competent evidence that his actions were ordered, directed, or approved in advance
by the superior, and that the other three requirements proposed in this Article are met as well.
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By any measure, the workload of Congress has expanded enormously in the last several
decades. Staff sizes have been enlarged dramatically to keep pace. Congressional aides
now play vital roles in almost every aspect of the legislative process, from drafting bills
and speeches to conducting investigations.
Moreover, recent studies indicate that congressional staff members have become
increasingly autonomous and self-directed. Because the demands on a typical Member of
Congress are formidable, Members have delegated "enormous authority" to their aides,
without having enough time to supervise its exercise effectively. Thus, staff members
often write speeches that are directly inserted in the Congressional Record, or committee
reports that are widely distributed, without these documents having been read prior to
publication by the Members of Congress for whom they were ostensibly prepared. Aides
also have a great deal of discretion in running congressional investigations-in deciding
what questions to ask and of whom, what investigatory techniques to use, and what
materials to place on the public record.
Staff members are hence in a position to vilify or embarrass those whom they do not
like or whose causes they oppose. Their temptation to do so can only be increased if they
are given the ability to invoke the protection of the speech or debate clause on their own.
Unlike Members of Congress, congressional aides are not accountable to the electorate for
activities they engage in under the protections of legislative privilege.
219
Thus, important considerations concerning the size, power, and unaccountability of
the congressional bureaucracy provide strong policy arguments for the grant of only
qualified discretionary-function immunity to those aides in constitutional tort actions.
The question remains, however, whether the separation-of-powers doctrine, as
reflected in the speech or debate clause, mandates absolute immunity for aides for the
performance of legislative acts even when the aide's acts were not ordered, directed,
or approved in advance by a Member. Is the "functional" difference between legisla-
tive and executive activities sufficient to require absolute immufiity for the legislative
aide, but only qualified immunity for the executive officer, in constitutional tort
actions?
The inquiry must begin with the purposes of the speech or debate clause, which
itself speaks only of the immunity of Senators and Representatives. 220 In United
States v. Brewster2 the Court stated: "The immunities of the Speech or Debate
Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or private
benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legislative process
by insuring the independence of individual legislators."- 222 The Court further
observed that the immunity "was designed to preserve legislative independence, not
The Note's proposal also would leave unprotected an aide who acted on the order or direction of his superior if his
superior subsequently refused to invoke immunity for the aide. Similarly, the Court in Gravel stated that "an aide's claim
of privilege can be repudiated and thus waived by the Senator." 408 U.S. 606, 622 n.13 (1972). Waiver of the aide's
claim of privilege should be allowed for testimony concerning actions, communications, or motives of the Senator
himself, but it would be highly unfair to withhold derivative immunity if requirements two, three, and four were met, and
the first was satisifed by proof that the aide had acted under the order or direction of the superior. Moreover, allowing the
superior to waive in this situation would not serve the purpose of derivative immunity-protecting the discretionary
functions of the superior. A climate in which a subordinate's derivative immunity arbitrarily could be withdrawn would
encourage the subordinate to refuse to execute decisions of the superior or to delay execution until the subordinate
determined whether it would be "safe" to carry them out.
219. Note, supra note 141, at 969-71 (footnote omitted).
220. See supra note 38.
221. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
222. Id. at 507.
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supremacy." 223 Gravel extended the reach of the clause to protect aides in order "to
implement its fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive and ju-
dicial oversight that realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legislator. "224
In Powell v. McCormack225 the Court stated that "the purpose of this clause was 'to
prevent intimidation [of legislators] by the executive and accountability before a
possibly hostile judiciary.' "226 The Court further stated:
Our cases make it clear that the legislative immunity created by the Speech or Debate
Clause performs an important function in representative government. It insures that legis-
lators are free to represent the interests of their constituents without fear that they will be
later called to task in the courts for that representation. 227
The question, therefore, is whether absolute discretionary-function immunity of
congressional aides is required to insure the integrity of the legislative process, to
preserve legislative independence, but not supremacy, and to prevent intimidation of
lesiglators by members of the other branches of government. Also relevant is the
question whether this immunity is necessary to promote the important constitutional
interest in representative government.
The absolute discretionary-function immunity of congressional aides is not re-
quired to serve these purposes. It is the courts' normal role within the separation-of-
powers framework to declare when another governmental branch has exceeded its
constitutional powers. 228 If a Member of Congress violates the constitutional rights of
another by performing a legislative act, he is immune from answering in civil
damages for his conduct. 229 However, "[the purpose of protection afforded legisla-
tors is not to forestall judicial review of legislative action but to insure that legislators
are not distracted from or hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by
being called into court to defend their actions.' 230 Like judges and the President,
Members of Congress are highly visible and vulnerable to frivolous lawsuits, and
their abuses of power are subject to significant restraints. In contrast, any distraction
of Members occasioned by the lack of an aide's absolute discretionary-function
immunity would be minimal compared with either the lack of absolute immunity of
Members themselves or the lack of the absolute derivative immunity of their aides. It
is unlikely that congressional employees would be frequent targets of frivolous
Bivens actions, because they usually lack high visibility. Moreover, their abuses of
power are not subject to the direct political restraints applicable to Members of
Congress. 23 1 Rather than promoting representative government, the grant of absolute
223. Id. at 508 (footnote omitted).
224. 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972).
225. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
226. Id. at 502 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966)). To the same effect, see the quotation
from Gravel, supra text accompanying note 99.
227. 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969).
228. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1974); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969).
229. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973).
230. Powell, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969).
231. In the last three decades, the size of congressional staffs has increased dramatically. Committee staffs have
increased almost eightfold, while personal staffs have increased fivefold. M. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIvEs 4
(1980). Support agency staffs also have grown significantly. Id. at 15-17. With this tremendous growth has come
increased dependence of elected representatives upon the congressional staffs. The great complexity of modem legislative
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discretionary-function immunity to congressional staff members might further
diminish the influence of constituents on congressional activity. The fundamental
constitutional purpose to deter official abuse of power is also a significant
consideration. 232
issues and the heavy demands of legislative schedules have caused Members of Congress increasingly to rely on their
aides, whose power has grown concomitantly. Id. at 4. This situation has caused "many of the elected members [to] fear
[that] they are becoming insulated administrators in a bureaucratized organization that leaves them no better able to cope
than they were when they did all the work themselves." Id. at 5.
In a budget report, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D., N.Y.) stated that the staff "takes on a life of its own: it becomes
an organization in its own right, and commences to behave like organizations behave." S. REP. No. 63, 96th Cong.. 1st
Sess. 332 (1979). He further stated that "[w]e become administrators, looking to the activities and the logistical needs of
our separate organizations, engaging in ever more complex patterns of cooperation and conflict with other such organiza-
tions, much in the manner that bureaucracies cooperate and compete in the executive branch." Id. Moynihan concluded
by proclaiming, "We make the laws. We must never allow ourselves to become merely the managers of great hierarchical
staffs that do this for us." Id. at 333.
The power of committee and subcommittee staffs derives in large part from their responsibility for collecting and
disbursing information. These staffs can facilitate or obstruct the efforts of elected representatives and their personal staffs
to acquire reliable and undistorted information. R. JONES & P. WOLL, THE PRIVATE WORLD OF CONGRESS 138-39 (1979);
M. MALiIN, supra, at 242-43. Senator Sam Nunn has stated: "We are in the position of being deferential to staff because
they have a lot of power and run the subcommittees or committees. They wield power but they are not a responsible part of
the process." R. JONES & P. WoLL, supra, at 138. Jones and Woll noted:
Thus staff, which started out as a symbol of status and an adjunct of power, has become a formidable power in
its own right. It has emerged as an independent force in Congressional politics. Aides play the same games as
their bosses and reap many of the same rewards. And they need never face the electorate.
Id. at 171 (emphasis in original).
Committee and personal staff members have some indirect responsibility to the electorate, because they serve at the
pleasure of their elected employers. There is considerable turnover in staffs, and the least displeasure of the employer may
lead to summary dismissal. Id. at 129; M. MALBtN, supra, at 21. Moreover, their jobs depend upon their employers'
remaining in office. R. JONES & P. WOLL, supra, at 163. New legislators frequently want to begin with an entirely new,
handpicked staff. Jones and Woll asserted: "Ultimately an aide's power stops where the desk of the man who employs
him begins. It is a political cliche that Washington is a harsh town, and there are thousands of aides who never understand
why their telephone stops ringing the morning after an election." Id. at 163-64.
Although aides are indirectly responsible to their employers' constituents, the aides' considerable discretionary
authority tends to cause them to "forget that their power is derivative." Id. at 164. Such forgetfulness eventually may lead
to dismissal, but it also may lead, in the meantime, to abuses of power. See, e.g., id. at 162-64, where the authors
describe an aide's growing power that ended with his discharge after he had created a wholly fictitious transcript of
committee hearings that never took place.
Many personal staff members undoubtedly are motivated by a desire to serve the needs of their employers' con-
stituents, and they may devote most of their time to that end. M. MALBIN, supra, at 14. However, members of personal.
committee, and support agency staffs are also motivated by their own personal career goals. Many hope to serve "on the
Hill" for a few years and then move on to important jobs in the executive branch or to Washington law and lobbying
firms. Id. at 22. The instability of staff jobs, the relatively low ceiling on salaries, and the desire to be in positions
providing greater personal recognition are all factors that have contributed to an increase in the number of staff aides who
have strong incentives to model their actions with a view towards their own ultimate career goals. Id. at 19-24. Reportedly
these incentives rarely lead to direct conflicts of interest. Id. at 23. However, they appear to influence some aides to
become more conciliatory to the interests of possible future employers as their work proceeds. Id. at 104. It cannot be
said, therefore, that staff members' sole or even primary goal necessarily is to maximize their employers' responsiveness
to constituent interests.
Given that many staff aides have a high degree of discretionary authority, little close supervision by their elected
superiors, and personal career objectives outside of Congress, it is clear that staff aides' responsibility to the electorate is
significantly weaker than that of Senators and Representatives.
232. An illustrative set of potential immunity issues is raised by a recent news report that the United States House of
Representatives has voted unanimously to authorize its ethics committee to investigate alleged alterations in official
committee reports. See N.Y. Times, July 1, 1983, at Al, col. 1. Several Republican Members of Congress have charged
that their statements at committee hearings were altered to make them look uninformed and ineffective. Id.
Should a defamation or other tort action grow out of these events, brought by Members of Congress against
congressional staff members, some interesting immunity issues could be raised.
First, if a defendant staff member could establish that his actions had been ordered, directed, or approved in advance
by a Member of Congress having responsibility for the committee reports, would the defendant be entitled to derivative
speech or debate clause protection? The making of committee reports is a "legislative function" protected by the clause.
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1973). And the motives behind an action are not subject to inquiry in
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Of course, the work of a congressional bureaucracy is essential to the effective
performance of legislative duties in today's complex governmental system. Gravel's
emphasis on the importance of the work of congressional aides as justification for the
extension of absolute derivative immunity,2 33 however, should not be read as jus-
tification for absolute discretionary-function immunity. Gravel involved a claim of
derivative testimonial immunity in a grand jury proceeding, not a claim of
discretionary-function immunity in a constitutional tort action. The independence of
legislators is directly implicated in an aide's claim of derivative immunity, but it is
not realistically threatened in an aide's claim of discretionary-function immunity. It is
the independence of legislators, not mere bureaucratic efficiency, that should be the
focus of attention under the separation-of-powers doctrine. Because the most efficient
government can also be the most abusive, the checks-and-balances role of the con-
stitutional separation of powers cannot be ignored. Justice Brandeis stated:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not
to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not
to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the
governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.2 34
The constitution's separation of powers into three coordinate branches of government
has two purposes-to protect each branch from improper control by another, and to
prevent each branch from exceeding its constitutional powers. As Justice Frankfurter
observed, "[t]he areas are partly interacting, not wholly disjointed.' '235 With due
respect for the tension between these two objectives, the Court should not abdicate its
chartered role in curbing abuses of official power by immunizing officials from
liability for constitutional excesses unless plainly required for the effective function-
ing of a coordinate branch of government in a constitutional system designed to
preserve democratic choice and individual rights.
determining whether one claiming immunity was acting within the scope of his authority. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct.
2690, 2705 (1982); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 508-09 (1975).
The defendant might have difficulty establishing that the Member from whom the claimed immunity "derived" had
authority to supervise the making of the reports. The defendant's most difficult task, however, probably would be to prove
that any Member had ordered, directed, or approved in advance the alterations. If the defendant could make this showing
by competent evidence, however, should derivative immunity be withheld simply on the strength of the Member's denial?
See the argument in note 218. supra, that the superior should not have a "veto" power over the claim of derivative
immunity.
If the defendant could make adequate proof on these issues, it seems likely that he would be entitled to derivative
immunity. Immunity properly could be withheld only if the court decided that the fourth requirement was unsatisfied-
that is. that extension of derivative immunity would be inappropriate on such facts as those alleged.
Second, if the defendant could establish only that his acts were taken within the scope of his employment, but not that
an authorized Member had ordered, directed, or approved in advance the alterations, the question again would arise
whether he should be entitled to derivative absolute immunity. As argued in the text, the defendant in this situation should
not be entitled to this immunity, even though his conduct involved a legislative act. See supra text accompanying notes
211-19.
Third, should the defendant, then, be entitled to a qualified discretionary-function immunity? If the defendant's duty
was merely to transcribe the committee proceedings, his conduct should not be regarded as "discretionary." The decision
to alter the reports, made by one whose duties were merely to make an accurate transcription, is not the kind of official
decision warranting protection. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. For such a ministerial function, the defendant
should not be protected by any immunity defense. See Sowle, supra note 5, at 383-93.
233. See supra text accompanying note 99.
234. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandris. J., dissenting), quoted in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring).
235. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald2 36 the Supreme Court properly refused to extend abso-
lute immunity to presidential aides in a constitutional tort action, reserving the
possibility that certain special functions, such as those involving national security or
foreign policy, might warrant such protection. The Court held that presidential aides'
discretionary-function immunity is controlled by Butz v. Economou,2 7 which held
that, in constitutional tort actions, cabinet officers are entitled to only qualified
immunity for their exercise of purely executive functions. The Court also refused to
extend absolute derivative immunity to presidential aides, distinguishing Gravel v.
United States,2 38 which granted such immunity to a congressional aide, on the basis
of a "functional" distinction between executive and legislative duties.
The rationale of Harlow and Gravel fails to take account of significant dif-
ferences between the purposes of discretionary-function and derivative immunity.
Their rationale leaves open the possibilities that presidential aides could be denied
absolute derivative immunity when it would be appropriate and that congressional
aides could be extended this immunity when it would be inappropriate. A sub-
ordinate should be entitled to absolute derivative immunity only if (1) the sub-
ordinate's conduct in question was ordered, directed, or approved in advance by his
superior; (2) the subordinate acted within the scope of his authority; (3) the superior
would have been entitled to absolute immunity had he engaged in the conduct him-
self; and (4) extension of immunity to the subordinate is necessary and appropriate to
protect the discretionary authority of the superior-that is, the immunity is "dele-
gable." These specific, narrowly drawn conditions for the application of derivative
immunity are consistent with the purpose of that defense-protection of the discre-
tionary functions of the superior of the defendant governmental employee.
Analysis of Harlow on the basis of these conditions indicates that its denial of
absolute derivative immunity can be justified on either of two grounds. It can be
argued that the first condition was not met because the defendants did not claim that
their conduct in question was ordered, directed, or approved in advance by the
President. This view of Harlow would leave open the possibility that presidential
aides would be entitled to absolute derivative immunity in a future case if they could
demonstrate that they acted on the orders or direction of the President or with his
advance approval. It also can be argued, however, that the first condition would be
satisfied if the facts were viewed, as they should have been on the defendants'
motions for summary judgment, in accordance with the plaintiff's conspiracy theory.
This view of Harlow would justify denial of derivative immunity on the ground that
the fourth condition, delegability of the President's absolute immunity, was un-
satisfied.
The second view of Harlow is the better view. It appears consistent with the
Court's "functional" basis for distinguishing Gravel. It also frankly recognizes the
236. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
237. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
238. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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desirability of viewing the absolute discretionary-function immunity extended to the
President in Nixon v. Fitzgerald239 as personal and nondelegable in most circum-
stances. The restraints upon the President's discretionary functions that would result
from the nondelegability of this immunity in most cases are both desirable and
justifiable within the contours of the separation-of-powers doctrine. Determination of
the delegability of the President's absolute immunity must be made, however, not on
the basis of the overly broad "functional" approach the Court employed in Harlow,
but with clear recognition that denial of derivative immunity operates as a restraint on
the President's discretionary authority. Although denial of derivative immunity in
Harlow was warranted, there may be situations in which its denial would unduly
constrain the President's constitutional powers. Determination of the delegability of
the President's immunity, therefore, should be made on the basis of a careful ap-
praisal of the probable effects that denial of absolute derivative immunity in a given
case would have on the President's authority and the acceptability of those effects
under constitutional doctrine.
Analysis of Gravel on the basis of the proposed conditions for the extension of
absolute derivative immunity indicates that it extended this immunity to a con-
gressional aide on a defensible basis. It is justifiable under the separation-of-powers
doctrine to recognize the delegability of speech or debate clause immunity, providing
the first three conditions for derivative immunity are also met, while denying dele-
gability of the President's absolute immunity in most instances. Careful distinctions
must be made between discretionary-function and derivative immunity, however.
The Court's failure to confine derivative immunity within the narrow limits dictated
by its distinct purpose could lead to its unwarranted application in constitutional tort
actions. Specifically, if absolute immunity were extended to congressional aides
when their conduct in question was not ordered, directed, or approved in advance by
a Member of Congress operating within the protection of the speech or debate clause,
the effect would be to give congressional aides an absolute discretionary-function
immunity. Such immunity is not justifiable as essential to the effective operations of
Congress, and it would unduly impair the purposes of the constitutional tort action to
redress personal injury and deter the abuse of official power.
239. 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
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